456
THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG
to pay
off-an area which the District Board members from the democracy movement had tended to neglect. In general, after the elections the democracy movement was anticipating a tough time ahead.
A conservative group, the Progressive Hong Kong Society, 24 also performed well in the 1988 elections. The introduction of parliamentary politics into the District Boards and the polarization of politics in Hong Kong had pushed the conservative forces in the District Boards to coalesce into a loose alliance. In 1985 this spontaneous alliance, with the help of the appointed members who occupied one-third of the seats in each District Board, had managed to limit the liberal pro-democracy District Board members to winning no more than two seats (plus three sympathizers) out of 56 in the Legislative Council through the electoral college system, and only one of the District Board chairmanships. In 1988 the democracy movement could only secure one solid sympathizer in the Legislative Council through the electoral college system, and just one District Board chairmanship. The alliance of conservative forces had become even more aggressive and effective. The Progressive Hong Kong Society offered a natural rallying point for the otherwise disorganized conservative District Board members, despite the dwindling personal popularity of its leader, Maria Tam.
Allen Lee, a member of the Legislative and Executive Councils who enjoys the support of the Shanghainese business community, publicly admitted late in 1985 that he had abandoned the formation of a political party. But in 1987 he organized a Hong Kong Economic Research Centre with Stephen Cheong, a conservative Legislative Councillor, planned along the model of the Japanese Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), the most powerful business lobby in Japan.
In the second Legislative Council elections in the territory in September 1988, only 98,000 people were qualified to vote in a community of 5.7 million-a franchise consisting of less than 2 per cent of the population. Among those qualified to vote, 63 per cent or 61,500 people initially registered as voters. But as 13 of the 26 elected seats were elected on an ipso facto basis, only 17,000 registered voters needed to bother to vote, and 9,275-9.5 per cent of the tiny minority qualified to vote in the elections actually voted. The turnout rate was 3.6 per cent lower than in the previous Legislative Council elections in September 1985.25
The pro-Beijing forces attempted to gain experience in the March 1988 District Board elections too. Their campaign appeared to be a manoeuvre in preparation for a more important contest to come. In some instances they worked
hard to get very
their candidates elected, especially those whose ties with China were clear to all. In a very small number of constituencies, they also campaigned hard to unseat unfriendly incumbents. In the urban districts of Kwun Tong and Wong Tai Sin, it appeared that their grassroots neighbourhood groups established earlier had begun to pay handsome dividends. Overall about a third of their near-100 candidates were returned.27
Generally, their strategy was one of denial. They were not prepared yet to field too many candidates. To do so would also be counterproductive, as it would alarm the public. 'United front' work has probably been stepped up since the March 1988
26
24. As note 23. The Progressive Hong Kong Society was formed in 1984. It was led by Maria Tam, member of the Legislative and Executive Councils and the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Many of its leading members come from the second generation of the established business families in the territory.
25. See Joseph Cheng, 'An analysis of the 1988 Legislative Council elections' (in Chinese), The Mirror (a Hong Kong Chinese monthly), No. 136, 10 Nov. 1988, pp. 12-15.
26. Emily Lau, 'China derails 'through train' reform plans', Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 140, No. 14, 7 Apr. 1988, p. 56.
27.
Lau, 'One point for democracy', p. 25.