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link the number of repatriated VBPS to the extent to which
Britain and other countries and organisations will provide
development aid.
C)
If and when regular
The availability of transport: deportation movements between Hong Kong and Vietnam take place,
the rate of repatriation may depend on the availability and
size of aricraft. In practice, however, this may not be a
problem if the rate at which VBPS are definitively screened-out
and Vietnam will accept its returning citizens remain at a low
level.
D) Monitoring arrangements: These will be an important factor
in determining how many screened-out VBPs can be repatriated
"in safety and dignity" (para 13a of the CPA).
(d) Public Handling
(i) This is the most difficult aspect. If we give notice.
beforee the first involuntary repatriation exercise of our
readiness to use "normal deportation procedures" for illegal immigrants, we run the risk that the exercise might have to be
aborted. The Vietnamese might argue that such measures would
break the terms of the Agreement of 26 June which states, "Acting upon its policy, the Vietnamese side considered
forcible repatriation as inappropriate". But to seek a further
agreement with the Vietnamese on this poirt carries a greater
risk that we will end up with no agreement.
(ii) At this stage we do not consider that we should make any public statements acknowledging the fact that force or "normal deportation procedures" may be used. We simply are not far
enough advanced in our thinking to make such a statement. We
consider that, unsatisfactory though it is, the following type of responses to press and public questions will have to
suffice:
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We must get all VBPS screened and return those who are not
refugees to Vietnam. This is provided for in the CPA.
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