CONFIDENTIAL
Thailand
12.
It was clear from the outset that the focus for this visit would be regional developments, particularly the fast-moving Cambodian picture. This was all the more so as there is little which needs discussion on the bilateral side. I pressed again for movement on Repatriation of Prisoners and separation of Air Services: on both the pace of progress is agonisingly slow, mainly because the Thais have yet to conclude that there is anything in it for them. I was also able to pursue a piece of defence sales business with the Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Defence. Though General Chatichai was clearly unbriefed, the point has now been registered and the Embassy will follow up.
13. It is on regional affairs where there is real dynamism. Chatichai is clearly chuffed to bits with his slogan of turning battle-fields into markets. He has already put things right with Laos and ensured that little matters such as human rights do not disturb Thai-Burmese relations. He is now turning his attention to Indo-China: Foreign Minister Siddhi was in Hanoi as I arrived in Thailand, and Chatichai talks of going himself "to welcome the troops home". It is clear also that Hun Sen would be a tolerated, if not welcome, visitor in Bangkok; and that generally the taboos of Thai/ASEAN thinking are being eroded very fast.
14.
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My talks with M R Kasem (the senior official who accompanied Siddhi), Prince Ranariddh (Sihanouk's son) and the baleful Son Sann (KPNLF) had a recurrent theme. As Derek Tonkin has already reported from Bangkok, there is now a real and growing prospect of a deal being sewn together on Cambodia: by the Soviet Union and China on the macro level; and by Thailand and Vietnam on the intermediate level. All four of these have bigger fish to fry, and relationships to develop which are too important to leave bogged down in the Cambodians' squabbling.
15. The missing element is the micro level, the Cambodians themselves. They are making no progress towards internal reconciliation, and fear that a deal is possible which suits all the major players and which will be made to stick whatever they think of it. At least the non-Communists fear this prospect, because if the conflict becomes "internalised" within Cambodia it is they who will be thrashed by the Khmer Rouge. We cannot expect the regional players to share our concern at this scenario (which I took every opportunity to underline with my Thai interlocutors). They will act to contain the Khmer Rouge not through altruism, but only if they reckon that an unreconstructed and/or unintegrated Khmer Rouge would pose a threat to their security or risk shoving the conflict one way or another back onto the international plane. Intelligent Thais do recognise this; and Kasem said that they would be working with the Vietnamese on "models" to resolve
CONFIDENTIAL