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5. The leaders who decided on the use of force did so after several attempts to persuade the students to leave the square, including the sending in of unarmed troops on 2 June, but the latter attempt appears to have been either poorly planned or deliberately designed to demonstrate the impossibility of restoring control without force.
The Leadership
6. It seems clear that Yang Shangkun and Li Peng, with or without Deng, were chiefly responsible for the decision to use force. They had the backing of several veteran leaders (nearly all octogenarians) including Chen Yun. Deng's role is not clear, but he was absent from view from 16 May until he appeared on television on 9 June, obviously in poor health.
7. At Deng's reappearance on 9 June, particular prominence was given to Yang and Li Peng among those accompanying him. Three of the five Politburo Standing Committee members were present (the absentees being Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili). Apparently only 6 out of the 13 full Politburo members normally resident in Peking were present on that occasion, but others have appeared subsequently. The group now in charge will wish to hold full Politburo and Central Committee meetings as soon as possible to legitimise and consolidate their control. Even if he lives on, Deng may be little more than a figurehead. Yang and Li Peng appear to have selected Qiao Shi to take over the Party General Secretaryship from Zhao Ziyang, although there could be other changes to strengthen Li Peng's authority in the Party as well as Government hierarchy. The extent of delay in calling such meetings will indicate the difficulty faced by Yang and Li in securing a consensus.
Policy Prospects
8. Official statements since the crack-down, including Deng's remarks on 9 June, have emphasised the "four cardinal principles" (essentially the need for leadership by the Communist Party) while reaffirming the policies of reform and opening up. Deng spoke of going ahead at a "steadier, better and even faster pace", but as the Ambassador has pointed out (in his telegram no. 1104 of 10 June), he referred to the line of 3rd plenum of 1978 but did not mention the policy line agreed by the 13th Congress in 1987. All this suggests that Deng and some others in the leadership have not abandoned the aim of rapid economic modernisation and that they "still see a need for reforms and economic co-operation with the West to that end. But other leaders who are more cautious about economic as well as political reform are likely to have increased influence in the short term.
9.
Accordingly, the most likely prospect is for a slowing in the pace of reform, while economic as well as other forms of
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/Western