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complementary) scheme.
Another and probably better theory is that they will never present an explicit agenda for regional economic cooperation because they have a traditional "hidden agenda" which still suits them best, ie to build on the natural links of culture and loyalty with those rapidly developing states and territories which have significant Chinese communities.
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
18.
At international level the striking development of the last year has been China's part in cooperation among the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. China has come further and faster in this respect than we would have dared hope when the first such experiment was made over Iran/Iraq in 1987. It has welcomed all subjects so far proposed for action by the Five and has been among the keenest on some, notably Cambodia. On at least one issue, Namibia, it has shown itself willing to uphold the line of the Five even when this led to complaints from traditional third-world "brothers". And it has pledged its first ever national contingent (albeit non-military) for a UN peace-keeping force, also in Namibia. All this represents a welcome consolidation of the constructively internationalist, non- ideological line in Chinese foreign policy and shows the country's readiness (as we had hoped) to start growing into its global responsibilities. But it also owes a lot to self-interest. Apart from the obvious kudos and influence gained, China by fostering cooperation à 5 can keep its eye on any parallel burgeoning of the Soviet Union's constructive role in the UN and can aim for a 4 to 1 line-up against Moscow on issues where it really matters. Every action taken by the Five also pleasingly underlines Japan's, and India's, exclusion from that forum. The practical value of peace- keeping experience to the PLA has already been pointed out.
19. In other fields of international action China has not behaved so well. It resists calls to join or even learn about the grouping which restricts exports of missile technology and a question-mark lingers over its own intentions in that field. Its defence sales policy in general is still driven by the foreign exchange needs of the PLA. The Chinese attended the London Conference on the Ozone Layer but used it as a platform to demand aid as their condition for cooperating. They have not been particularly active or helpful in the field of aviation security, which is still not a live problem for them. They are still not party to any important international disarmament agreements, though the crunch may be drawing closer on CW. In all these areas where cooperation has no strong political attraction and offers no edge over their competitors, the power of national interest in their policy - and their instinct for avoiding commitments - shows clear through the internationalist veneer. It is perhaps the main field in which China's Western partners should now be pushing for improvement.
20. The strength of the underlying bilateralist, opportunist pattern in Chinese foreign policy is seen perhaps above all in China's attitude to a regional security framework for Asia. That Peking should set
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