CONFIDENTIAL
LUND ZUENTIAL
9.
Mag
In Tibet last but not least there is a particularly clear contrast between the Chinese leaders' claims to be pursuing a policy of welfare, education and economic reform bringing unheard of benefits to the Tibetan people, and the reality of blood on the streets of Lhasa. As Mr Clark shows, the Tibetan situation has so many special features that it must almost be regarded as qualitatively different. One of them is the primitive and, so far as we can see, unshakeable Chinese determination to put down any protest that smacks of "separatism" and thus threatens Peking's sovereignty and security, Another is the factor of sheer distance and poor communication, so that what may look to a Peking planner like a balanced carrot- and-stick policy ends up as a blunt and
a blunt and cainful instrument in the hands of frightened, unreconstructed local cadres. The Dalai Lama cannot control everything that is done in his name aither. Racial animosity is bitterly strong on both sides.
It
10.
But to appreciate the reasons for China's still patchy record is not to say that we should not try to improve it. is in the Chinese leadership's own interests to do better, not just to please international opinion but to ensure the success of their own reforms. There is no reason why we should not make the case to them, more forcibly and more deliberately than in the past. The question is the means and arguments to use. The Chinese knee-jerk negative reaction to "interference" has deep historical and psychological roots, not least where Britain is concerned. We will generally do better to turn the Chinese leaders' own claims and arguments back against them, rather than arguing a priori from our own or "universal" values. A strong argument of the first kind could be made along at least two lines. First, Chinese leaders make great play with responsibility and concern for international law and the international community in their foreign policy. We are bound to judge their reliability in this, and their fitness a senior partners in managing world affairs, partly by the way they respect their own undertaking to their own citizens. we can underscore the connection which has been well proved in other socialist countries - between the rule of law and respect for human rights and the success of internal reform. If we support the Chinese in the latter we have a right to urge them to take the steps which they themselves have recognised as being necessary for is. If we can continue to offer practical bilateral help for China in law reform and the professionalisation of the civil service and perhaps also in police training, this will not only give substance to our words but also strengthen our right to keep on speaking.
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Secondly
11. The more clearly we put across these general points, the less risk there will be of our concerns over Tibet being taken out of context by the Chinese, branded as excessive or dismissed as gratuitous interference. In policy terms it is probably best to go on treating Tibet as a special and more urgent case of a broader problem in Chinese behaviour. All the above arguments can be used on Tibet, plus two specific ones.
First, as the Chinese themselves must recognise in objective moments,
CONFIDENTIAL
the
/Tibetans
IN WHICH
HAS REFORM SUCCEEDED?