14 June 1989]
[Mr Wells Conid
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, QC, MP, MR R McLaren and Mr A Paul
mobilise the widest possible international support for whatever action was then necessary. I think to try and do that now in relation to a hypothesis we all hope devoutly is not going to happen will neither get the response you want nor help head off the hazard you want to avoid. Think of the enormous difficulty of mobilising a response in relation to the boat people, a measured group of ut people to be counted in tens of thousands. As in Geneva yesterday, it is so hard to secure even a response to that. I think that something compar- able to compassion if you take that example would pertain in relation to the question you are putting. It is hard enough for us in the United Kingdom with our direct, continued exposure to the Hong Kong question. One understands the hazards of it. Outside the United Kingdom it is very difficult to say. I think all one can say is that if the worst were to happen plainly the special responsibility of the United Kingdom for the people of Hong Kong would be inescapable and part of that responsi- bility would be a responsibility to mobilise the widest possible international help. I do not think one is going to be able to achieve more than that along the lines you are suggesting at this stage.
Mr Taylor
992. Secretary of State, can I examine more carefully your answer to Peter Shore? The problem with the insurance policy that people in Hong Kong have been putting forward and also people in this country and the press is that in a sense the policy can be cashed in at the decision of those living in Hong Kong and they would, if they had passports, be able to come to this country when they chose. What you were saying is a different sort of insurance policy, that in the event that there were a catastrophe in Hong Kong and there were, there- fore, political refugees from Hong Kong after 1997, there would be a clear obligation on the British Government, with or without the help of other countries, to take those people in. In other words, Britain would be, in terms of a political catas- trophe, the home of last resort.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I was addressing myself in talking about insurance policy to the proposition of rights to be granted now which could be, as you say, encashed now, but that is in the context of the insurance policy argument that is advanced because the people ought to have an insurance on the basis that they may never need to use it. The alternative situation that I was discussing was the situation that if, in fact, the worst happened and the population of Hong Kong were driven by events into de facto refugee status, then plainly Britain would have a special responsibility to respond to that and would seek to spread the response to that responsibility as widely as poss- ible. That is different from the insurance policy.
993. Secretary of State, I understand that is different. I just want to be absolutely clear that the conclusions are properly drawn. The insurance policy in a sense to which you were referring was that if everything did go terribly wrong after 1997
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[Continued
there would be a possibility that former citizens of the colony of Hong Kong as a last resort would be taken as political refugees into this and perhaps other countries?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) Yes, but I was distinguishing that concept from the context in which the insurance policy is normally talked about. These people, I think I am right in saying, say: “We should now be granted the right of access to the United Kingdom in our present state, and our option and we are entitled to that insurance policy.” That is what I was talking about in answer to Bowen Wells, but in the alternative last resort situation of events overwhelming the people of Hong Kong, then in those circumstances it is, I think, inescapable that the United Kingdom with its special responsibility for the territory would be the country to which they would look for treatment as refugees, and we have to try and discharge that responsibility with the help of others.
994. What you have just said in a sense should give comfort to those people who stay in Hong Kong knowing that—what nobody wants and what everybody is trying to avoid-if it did happen there could be the insurance that Britain and perhaps others would be the home of last resort for political refugees beyond 1997?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I think that is right. I think in series of events in which people were seeking to the face of that kind of overwhelming cataclysmic
would have to respond to that and would seek to claim and exercise rights as refugees, Britain clearly
mobilise a response internationally.
Chairman
995. I think what you have just said gives us the impression that you can fairly say you are giving the sort of catastrophe last resort insurance cover that many people around the world would feel was ultimately, in fact, unavoidable, inevitable and proper, both from Britain and all the other civilised nations of the earth. Is that a right interpretation?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) What I think I am trying to say is, quite apart from Hong Kong, Britain, like every other country, does have international obli- gations towards refugees. In view of our particular connection with and responsibility for Hong Kong those are obligations we should have to take very seriously indeed in respect of anyone from Hong Kong claiming refugee status, and if the scale of that claim was so large then we should need in that context, as in any other, to secure the widest possible international help in responding.
Mr Rowlands
996. Can I pursue this point but take it a bit further. With your breadth of knowledge I know you will have come across the concept of an incho- ate right, that is, a right that lies dormant but can be triggered off under specific criteria or well-defined criteria. Would not that idea or concept be one that would apply in this situation, by which you grant an inchoate right to those for whom we have responsibility, the passport holders, but it can only