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14 June 1989]
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, QC, MP, MR R McLaren and MR A Paul
[Mr Lawrence Conid] advancing the confidence building aspects of the Basic law; and you provided a substantial part of the argument in response to Dennis Canavan. But I just want to ask you what people may be saying is what kind of changes in the basic law do you see as being possible which will bring about a situation where if after 1997 there are demonstrations in Peking which the Chinese authorities want to repress by putting in the troops and shooting the people will nevertheless mean that after 1997 if there are similar demonstrations in Hong Kong, they will not be able to put in the troops and shoot the people? Is there any way in which we can bar- gain forward or negotiate forward a change in the Basic law to make sure that that does not happen?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I have already discussed that with Mr Rowlands in some detail. It is the fourth paragraph of Article 18. I discussed that earlier on. Of course, it is a very real question, but I have identified the answer.
966. I am not sure you have, with respect. (Sir Geoffrey Howe) Forgive me. Mr Rowlands seems to think I have because he was giving the answer before I gave it myself.
Mr Rowlands
967. He gave me the answer/it must be re-negot- iated.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I hesitate, with the utmost respect, to suggest the posibility of a moment's inattention of behalf of one of my Honourable
Ond lecuned adversery friends. Xousquets on the right point Article 18, the fourth paragraph, is clearly import- ant to that. I think if I can just add one other gloss as to the reality of what we are now talking about, all of us around this room are saying “Would it not be desirable if" for very good reasons. I think I share all the insights that people have. In the same breath we are saying “How can you conceivably talk in these terms because of what we are now facing?" This is the present hideously focused dilemma in terms of time, and we have to remind ourselves of how different the scene was two months ago and what happened ten years before. We have to remind ourselves of how different Poland is today from what it was nine or ten years ago. This is not because I have some divine faith in the theory of human progress. Things can go forward and they can come back. In China, they have gone back teżała very sharp, severe, brut- ́‘aldom in recent weeks. What we are looking for is brake the way in which we should try and approach these questions as and when, when and if, the oppor- tunity arises, with all the reservations that we all share.
Chairman: We just have one more question on troops and defence forces which are undoubtedly very much in everybody's mind.
Mr Taylor
968. Foreign Secretary, if we can leave aside the questions of divine faith or the detail of the draft of the Basic law, there is one thing for which the British Government does have some direct
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[Continued
responsibility. That is HMS Tamar in the centre of Hong Kong. Why is that not currently part of the overseas estate?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) The position is that it is Crown property but not held by the Crown in the role of Her Majesty's UK Government but held by the Crown in right of Hong Kong. That is as it always has been. HMG does not own the site or the buildings. Insofar as it is not required for the facilities of the garrison, it reverts to the Hong Kong Government.
969. With the benefit of hindsight perhaps it is unfortunate that the problem was not foreseen at the same time as the Joint Declaration; in other words, that something which is so important to Britain as opposed to purely Hong Kong was not transferred to the Crown Estate under the direct supervision of the Government in London.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) But the same argument could be extended, I suppose, to almost everything that is vested in the Hong Kong Government. It has been from the beginning of time part of the Crown property in Hong Kong. I think that had there been an attempt at that time to begin transfer- ring the assets as it were from HKG to HMG, that might have raised the same complications.
970. I think there might be a lesser compli- cation. I fear we might have it in 1997, not having done it. But could I put another idea to you which has exercised the Committee, which is that we knowingly to hand over the current HMS Tamar would be very embarrassingly placed if we were in 1997 as a military establishment. Would it not be sensible to ensure that Tamar by 1997 was in fact the site of the new British consular-general Consulate ince which has been talked about but not yet clearly planned?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) The location of the Consul- ate general is in the first instance a matter of dis- cussion between ourselves and the Hong Kong Government. We recognise the importance of securing an important, prestigious site; I think that is the language that has been used on it. How far we are able to secure a more general relocation of the defence facilities is still a matter for further discussion,
regard that as important and have not yet found 971. I think that the Committee would certainly
anything very clearly even under Annex III of the ca land leases which would prevent the British responsbilities in Hong Kong prior to 1997 about Government taking its own decision about its own
a site that is extremely sensitive.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) Yes, I appreciate the import- consideration, even previous months. It will ance of it, and it is a matter that has been under
deserve further, very careful examination. I fully understand the importance of it.
Chairman: I think it is something which does worry the Committee but because time is pressing I wonder if we could just move on a little and come back to the mainstream of the status of the Joint Declaration, particularly its international status.
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