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14 June 1989]
[Mr Wells Contd]
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
RT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, QC, MP, MR R McLaren and MR A Paul
will give its cooperation in this connection." Do you not think that the Government of the People's Republic of China have withdrawn their co-oper- ation in this connection and thereby have breached the Joint Declaration?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I do not think one can reach that conclusion in relation to the obligations in relation to Hong Kong. They are plainly taking action affecting China itself and the Chinese society, which sharply affect Chinese ability to maintain its performance, but I do not think one can identify any action in relation to Hong Kong which had this effect.
961. But a huge demonstration took place on successive days in the streets of Hong Kong which, because of the self discipline and the co-operation of the royal Hong Kong police, with those crowds of people in the streets, led to no disorder whatso- ever. But clearly there was a reaction in Hong Kong to the events in Peking which upset the stability and undoubtedly, looking at the Hang Seng index and other signs,have upset the ability of the British Government's obligation to maintain and preserve the economic prosperity and social stability of Hong Kong.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) Yes, I mean it clearly does not represent a profitabic fulfilment of the agree- ment and it is something one would far rather had not happened. The fact is that a whole range of things can happen. Some of them have happened to affect the economic atmosphere in Hong Kong. That is one of the reasons why confidence has been considerably shaken there. That is one of the messages we’should be wanting, if the opportunity × œpresents itself, to go on trying to get back to the
government in China. One of the central propos itions which lay at the heart of the early negotia- tions was to try and make the Chinese authorities understand the need for independent, autonomous management of the Hong Kong economy. It is like trying to instruct any minister in any western economy, because there is a very low entry level, that careless talk can damage exchange rates. That is a very elementary level. But if you translate that into the impact that a Chinese authority in Peking, shaking the entire tree of the Chinese constitution, Can to have on the fragile economy of Hong Kong, of
course that is enormous. I do not say that it has. But it does not follow from that that we therefore walk away from the agreement. We come back to them and say "For God's sake, do you understand what is happening?"
[Continued
allowed its own defence force rather than a PLA garrison?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I am sure that in principle it would not be right to seek to re-negotiate the Joint Declaration. I am equally sure it would be right to seek to buttress and fortify the positive provisions of it as far as we possibly can, either by, as Mr. Rowlands was suggesting, re-examining the scope for change in the basic law or by looking at ways of supplementing it de facto. One of the ways that relates to what you have been talking about has been the extent to which there has been taking place a substantial strengthening of the resources of the Hong Kong police, so that the numbers available for the Hong Kong internal security organisation under the control of the Hong Kong Government have increased, and thereby made it more capable of fulfilling the objectives I have pensbu referred to of internal public order. That is the kind of de facto change which it is important to achieve and which requires continuous understanding on both sides. There are other examples.
964. You do not think it would be feasible to negotiate an agreement within the terms of the Joint Declaration whereby Hong Kong had its own defence force rather than having a garrison of the PLA established and present within Hong Kong?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I think that the feature which is in the agreement itself, which distinguishes between Hong Kong's responsibility for public order and the Chinese People's Republic's responsibility for defence, is a distinction that can- not be gainsaid. The Joint Declaration does give the PRC the right to have forces in Hong Kong; but the size and the location of those forces is obviously something that is a matter for further discussion. Again it is a matter that has previously been in the negotiations of this Article, It was a matter that I discussed with the greatest care, and the achievement of this Article in its present form was a very substantial step forward, to get clearly recognised the responsibility of the SAR for public order internally and to confine the role of the Army to defence was itself a very substantial step for- ward. We are not unmindful of the desirability of trying to influence the size and location of such forces as do come with what you have got very much in mind. What form the achievement of that may take, one does not know. Indeed, to be talking about it in the present circumstances is almost to sound unrealistic, but it has still got to be there as an objective over the next eight years.
Chairman: We will come to the location question
962. Would you accept that they have infringed in a moment. the agreements at least in spirit?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) They have certainly impaired our ability on all sides to fulfil the objectives of the agreement.
Mr Canavan
963. Would it be feasible to enter negotiations to amend the Joint Declaration or to improve it by for example adding bits on to it to give additional guarantees? For example, might Hong Kong be
Mr Lawrence
965. Following Mr Canavan's point, the opti- mists think that the bloodshed has made the Chinese authorities so vulnerable to the need to make concessions in order to really restore their standing or their acceptability in the world, that we may actually be able to get more concessions out of them than we have done hitherto. You have been talking about scope for further discussions in
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