14 June 1989]
[Mr Rowlands Contd
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
RT HON SIR Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP, MR R MCLAREN and MR A PAUL
good example of it. What one cannot escape is the necessity to acknowledge the existence of a frontier between federal law and the law of the Special Administrative Region that is envisaged for Hong Kong. It is not a totally independent country. There must be some judicial agency for resolving disputes on that frontier. That, I think, is the basic minimum that we cannot escape. The revised draft has gone further that the original draft did in con- ferring the judicial powers of interpretation on the organs of the SAR. It has to be seen alongside Articles 81 and 84, which provide for final judicial determination to be done by the SAR courts. I cannot say more than this at the moment but clearly this will be an area which will need further re-examination to be carried forward as far in the direction you have identified as possible.
956. Let me give you, if I may, a vivid illus- tration of what, if this stood as it stands, could happen. Would it not be possible, for example, that if there is a demonstration in Hong Kong against the leadership in China after this Basic Law has been put in place, that whereas Hong Kong might claim on the interpretation of the Basic Law that this is an internal matter and, therefore, should be dealt with by the SAR internal forces and police, etc., it would be perfectly possible for the metro- politan government or the salaried government of China to say, “No, this is not just a matter of internal law and order, this is a matter of the secur- ity and defence of the state and, therefore, falls within our jurisdiction," and, therefore, will take action of a completely different kind and character from what in most cases one would assume this particular article would allow? In other words, there are now real, genuine reasons to have great concern that such a sweeping power as this allows the Chinese authorities to re-interpret that law to say that the behaviour on the Hong Kong streets of students saying, "Deng Xiaoping should go," is, in fact, a challenge to the state itself and, therefore, not a matter for the SAR, and immediately that would give them a right to declare martial law and so forth and take over the handling and coping with the demonstration.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) You are focusing on a point of very great importance, I quite agree. Almost one of the last pieces we secured in the negotiation of the Joint Declaration was Article XII, which provides, as you will recall, in the first sentence: "The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special Admini- People's
strative Region Government. Military forces sent Goment by the Central Administrative Region for the
purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Admini- strative Region." If one puts that alongside the existing provisions of Article 18 of the Basic Law, which permit the Standing Committee of the NPC to declare a state of turmoil, that clearly requires re-examination in order to secure the reassurance you have in mind, because one has to do everything one possibly can to buttress and consolidate the ability of the SAR authorities to handle questions
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[Continued
of that kind. You are quite right, it is one of the matters that will need close attention. I emphasise always, of course, this is not a matter with which the United Kingdom is directly concerned. It is a matter for the formulation of the Basic Law, but that does not mean it is a matter...
957. We cannot wash our hands of it?
which we do not interest ourselves.
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) No, it is not
Mr Canavan
matter in
958. Foreign Secretary, are there any circum- stances at all in which the British Government would refuse to hand over sovereignty in 1997 or even postpone the handling over of sovereignty beyond 1997? Supposing, for example, the Chinese government showed by its actions between now and 1997 that it was not honouring the commitments contained in the Joint Declaration and had no intention of doing so. Would you still be in favour of handing over sovereignty uncon- ditionally in 1997?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) One has to ask oneself what kind of circumstances are you there contemplating. The facts remain that the lease runs out in 1997 and sovereignty follows the expiry of that lease, and it is in order to secure the right conditions for that to happen that we have been putting all this work into what has been taking place in recent years. But I think if one is contemplating your question one would really be contemplating a repudiation of everything that had already been done, so I think one would be extremely reluctant to regard that as a course one should follow.
959. Suppose this were 1997 instead of 1989. Would you be prepared to hand over the sover- eignty now in the immediate aftermath of the blood-bath we have all witnessed?
(Sir Geoffrey Howe) I think that is a question one would have to look at in the circumstances of the time, quite honestly. Supposing we were now in 1997. One cannot tell what the reaction of the Chinese authorities would be to the situation in
Hong Kong at that time. It raises the most grisly implications, I fully acknowledge that, but our abil- ity to respond would depend on exactly what was happening at that time. The crucial foundation would be the existence of an agreement between ourselves and Hong Kong to be upheld in inter-
national law.
Mr Wells
960. Foreign Secretary, in the Joint Declaration, Article 4, it says: “The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People's Republic of China declare that, during the tran- sitional period between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China
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