(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
5.
Khoan
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
the threat of repatriation to Vietnam was one of a number of measures which would deter departures; repatriation would need to be arranged in a phased
manner;
financial assistance from the international community, including HMG, was another important component. (Comment: Mr Clift had to intervene to make clear that we had not accepted this in principle);
lists of returnees would need to be handed over;
the means of transport for returnees could be by air or by ship;
identified three points of disagreement:
the definition of economic migrant and illegal immigrant (and whether repatriation should be confined to volunteers); Vietnamese officials should participate in the repatriation process in Hong Kong and conversely Hong Kong officials should do so by coming to Vietnam;
how to raise the necessary financial assistance.
6. For our part, we added a further point on which we had reached agreement:
Vietnamese assurances that returnees would be treated in a humane fashion.
(xi)
7.
This was not a bad summary of two days' discussions. But it also highlights the crucial importance of persuading the Vietnamese to accept our argument that, according to international practice, the Hong Kong Government has the right to determine whether or not the Vietnamese boat people are refugees and, if they are deemed to be illegal immigrants, that Vietnam must accept them back. Establishing this in Round 2 will, I suggest, be our prime objective.
роднит
DH Colvin
CONFIDENTIAL