CONFIDENTIAL
FM HONG KONG
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3192
OF 31103OZ AUGUST 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE HANOI
718
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY Q DIST ?.
HKD 243/8
RECEIVERIN R
DESK
31 AUG 1988
026443
MDHIAN 1753
INDE
N
S
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, PEKING, WASHINGTON, BANGKOK INFO PRIORITY KUALA LUMPUR, TOKYO OTTAWA, CANBERRA
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YOUR TELNO 2197: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG
695
1. HANOI TELNO 296 OFFERED SOME VERY HELPFUL INSIGHTS INTO CURRENT VIETNAMESE THINKING. WE AGREE THAT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR SOME ENCOURAGEMENT ALTHOUGH WE SHALL NEED TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE MALAYSIANS HAVE REACHED WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER OUR TACTICS IN DETAIL.
2. ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED IN TUR WE AGREE THAT WE MUST BE FLEXIBLE IN SEEKING TO EXPLOIT VIETNAMESE AIMS TO OUR ADVANTAGE. THIS CERTAINLY APPLIES TO THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE VIETNAMESE VISIT TO HK. IF IT APPEARED THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD PRODUCE WORTHWHILE DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF OUR OWN LONGER TERM AIMS WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE IDEA EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT CREAT SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS.
3. THE DIFFICULTY HOWEVER IS THAT WE BELIEVE THAT A VISIT NOW WOULD NOT SECURE US ANYTHING TANGIBLE. IT WOULD ONLY COVER THE RETURN OF SOME OF THE VOLUNTEERS. THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS WOULD LEAD ON TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENT. OF COURSE, IF THE VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO COME ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF SCREENED OUT BOAT PEOPLE AS WELL AS VOLUNTEERS, THAT WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER. BUT WE IMAGINE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN SUCH AGREEMENT BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.
4. AT THE SAME TIME WE AGREE THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SPEED UP THE RETURN OF THE VOLUNTEERS AND TO PLAY THIS UP IN OUR PUBLICITY. WE SUGGEST THAT THE BEST MOVE MIGHT BE ANOTHER APPROACH THROUGH THE EMBASSY IN HANOI WHICH WOULD:
(A) URGE THE VIETNAMESE TO COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
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CONFIDENTIAL