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Background
3.
The proposal for talks was made to the Chargé d'Affaires in
Hanoi (Hanoi telno 244). He was told that the Vietnamese Council of
Ministers had decided to seek a solution to the refugee problem.
Representatives of the Hong Kong Government were invited to Hanoi to
negotiate the return of Vietnamese in Hong Kong. The Vietnamese
team might be headed by a Vice Foreign Minister. The best time for talks would be mid-July. From a subsequent exchange (Hanoi telno
250) we have learnt that Thailand, Malaysia and UNHCR have been
invited to hold similar talks.
4.
There are strong arguments for accepting the Vietnamese
offer. It follows logically from our pressure on the Vietnamese
to take back their boat-people that the next step must be
bilateral discussion of the modalities. We cannot rely on UNHCR
to conduct these negotiations, even if they showed greater
urgency than hitherto and overcame their inhibitions about the
involuntary return of non-refugees. A failure to take up this
Or elsewhere invitation would not be understood in Hong Kong. On the other
hand public knowledge that talks with the Vietnamese were taking
place would be a sorely-needed deterrent at a time when arrivals
of boat people in Hong Kong are running at as high a level as
ever.
5. At the same time we must go into the talks with our eyes open.
There has been a significant move from the earlier Vietnamese
position that returnees could only be considered on a case by case basis. But the Vietnamese will seek to impose their own conditions.
They have reportedly told UNHCR (but not ourselves) that returns
must be on a voluntary basis: this is not a promising starting
position if Hong Kong's requirements are to be met. A clear link is
made with the provision of economic assistance, and moreover in an
unhelpfully broad context. A letter from Co Thach to the UN
Secretary-General refers to "economic assistance in areas undergoing
serious economic difficulties which are or have been areas of
illegal departures". More generally it suits Vietnam's general
political strategy, at a time when it is coming under pressure on a
number of fronts, to give an appearance of new flexibility and a
CONFIDENTIAL