CONFIDENTIAL
4.
REFUGEE PROBLEMS: HONG KONG/SRI LANKA/EASTERN EUROPE
7..
a
Shultz said that the refugee situation in Hong Kong was microcosm of a broader picture. There was a tremendous struggle in the US Administration at the moment on the question of what constituted a refugee and what an economic refugee. The US quota of 165,000 for this year was under impossible pressure. The Administration had taken a deliberate decision not to open the debate widely until the Summit was over, because the US could not undertake to accept refugees who might wish to leave the USSR in large numbers. It was paradoxical that there had been a great out- cry in the US when the Thais began pushing the boat people back to sea. Countries of first asylum were getting tougher, partly because the willingness of countries of settlement, like the US, was
declining. He foresaw a number of problems. That in South East Asia was already upon us; the US could soon face a problem of refugees leaving the USSR and Eastern Europe; and there could be chaos in Central America as people tried to flee, eg Nicaragua. The problem was no less acute in Africa but, although the numbers were huge, African refugees tended to stay within that continent. The common factor in many of these situations was that those trying to leave their countries were not refugees but leaving for economic reasons. Referring to the experience of the US as a country of sanctuary, the Secretary of State recalled the large numbers of people leaving Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The flow of Vietnamese to Hong Kong was increasing, because the Thais were turning people. away. We had also not realised until recently that many Vietnamese refugees, travelling along the China coast, stopped in China for supplies etc, but were not permitted/did not want to stay there. But the basic problem about Hong Kong was that it simply did not offer a transit point to a future. We had to get this point across. Neither Hong Kong nor Britain had the ability to absorb Vietnamese refugees. Likewise, we could not absorb Sri Lankans. As a result, we had decided that we could no longer offer them refuge in this country while their cases where being heard: we now insisted that airlines returned them to their country of origin and that any attempt to seek settlement in Britain should be conducted from their home country. The FRG showed how matters could get out of hand, with something like 700,000 "refugees" applying for citizenship actually from within FRG borders.
8.
In Hong Kong, there was mounting despair at
at the number of Vietnamese refugees arriving. The number in camps had been declining until September 1987. Since then, the numbers had gone up seven-fold, and there could be up to 25,000 in camps by autumn 1988. This had forced us to consider a change of policy, to apply a
Hons Re
screening processat (British) ports of entry. This would be designed as a signal to indicate that Hong Kong simply did not offer a step to a future elsewhere. If we were able to check the inflow, we would look to our partners to help clear those in the camps. Shultz said that he was glad the Secretary of State had used partners in the plural. The Australians and Canadians had done particularly well in helping with the offtake of refugees.
CONFIDENTIAL