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7. It is evident that the introduction of a policy on these lines
would be controversial. To take our various constituencies in
turn:
(i)
public reaction in Britain, as reflected in Parliament,
would be critical. But there would be a tenable defence
in the arguments that Hong Kong had no alternative if it
was to avoid being overwhelmed; that resettlement was no
long an appropriate or effective response to the problem;
and that genuine refugees would continue to be correctly
treated;
(ii) UNHCR would probably acquiesce in a policy which applied
UNHCR criteria to the identification of genuine refugees,
but would express concern about what would happen to those
screened out;
(iii) the resettlement countries would express varying degrees
of concern. Canada and Australia would react with
relative equanimity. The US would be more critical. But
at the recent meeting of the Inter-Governmental
Consultative Group on Indo-Chinese Refugees all three, nad
even the UNHCR, were prepared to support "guidelines" on
the treatment of Vietnamese boat people which included the
concept of screening;
(iv)
legal commentators could question the compatability of
such a policy with our obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We would not have
a watertight answer, any more than we do over the present
closed camps policy. But correct treatment of genuine
refugees would help to blunt criticism from this quarter.
We conclude that there would be sharp criticism at home and some
criticism internationally; but that at the end of the day we would
expect this to be manageable.
8. There are also obvious risks for Hong Kong. It may prove impossible, despite the most vigorous representations, to persuade
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