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(ii)
(iii)
X
(iv)
in the arguments that Hong Kong had no alternative if it
was to avoid being overwhelmed; that resettlement was no
long an appropriate or effective response to the problem;
and that genuine refugees were being correctly treated;
UNHCR would express concern, but would probably acquiesce in a policy which applied UNHCR criteria to the identification of genuine refugees;
the resettlement countries would express varying degrees
of concern. Canada and Australia would react with
relative equinamity. The US would be more critical. But
at the recent meeting of the Inter-Governmental
Consultative Group on Indo-Chinese Refugees all three, nad
even the UNHCR, were prepared to support "guidelines" on
the treatment of Vietnamese boat people which included the
concept of screening;
We
legal commentators could question the compatability of
such a policy with Hong Kong's obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
would not have a watertight defence, any more than we do
over the present closed camps policy. But correct
treatment of genuine refugees would help to blunt criticism from this quarter.
We conclude that there would be sharp criticism at home and some criticism internationally; but that at the end of the day we would
expect this to be manageable.
If the
7. There are also obvious risks for Hong Kong. It may prove impossible, despite all our representations, to persuade the
Vietnamese to take back the boat people against acceptable guarantees about the treatment they would receive on return. new policy had inadequate deterrent effect, new arrivals could keep on coming. Hong Kong could be left with a steadily increasing population of detainees with no hope of resettlement, no prospect of
repatriation and no incentive to co-operative with their gaolers. In presenting a policy on those lines internationally, we would face
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