RESTRICTED
MOLO
PRESSURE, BUT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BECOME A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE REGION SO LONG AS THEY REMAINED UNATTRACTIVE AS AN ECONOMIC PARTNER. THEY HAD EXERTED LIMITED PRESSURE ON VIETNAM BUT
WERE CONSTRAINED BECAUSE VIETNAM WAS NO PUPPET.
4. BARIANI (FRANCE) SAW GORBACHEV AS ACTIVELY TRYING TO
ENCOURAGE A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT BUT WITHOUT APPLYING THE
NECESSARY PRESSURE ON VIETNAM. ASEAN'S EFFORTS ON CAMBODIA WERE TO BE APPLAUDED, PARTICULARLY THAILAND'S TOLERANCE OVER THE REFUGEE SITUATION. FRANCE SUPPORTED SIHANOUK AS THE RIGHTFUL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND VALUED HIS DEMOCRATIC
ASPIRATIONS. VIETNAM WAS THE KEY AND THEY HAD TO BE INVOLVED IN THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. VAN DEN BROEK (THE NETHERLANDS) CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS NO CERTAINTY OF WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA AND PRESSED ASEAN FOR A MORE PRECISE VISION OF THE POST
WITHDRAWAL PHASE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MORE LEVERAGE OVER
VIETNAM THROUGH AID THAN THEY ADMITTED.
5. SIDDHI (THAILAND) THOUGHT THE SLOW PROGRESS OF THE SIHANOUK/HUN SEN TALKS HAD PROVIDED VIETNAM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO SOW SEEDS OF DISAGREEMENT IN THE CGDK COALITION AND IN ASEAN.
SIHANOUK NEEDED SUPPORT IN HIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND SIDDHI SAW
A ROLE FOR A JAKARTA MEETING IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE EC SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST
FACTIONS INCLUDING SIHANOUK AND TO SPONSOR THE ASEAN RESOLUTION
AT THE NEXT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION. ALI ALATAS (INDONESIA) SAW PROGRESS ON CAMBODIA AS BEING TWIN-TRACKED: AN ASEAN OR ASIAN INITIATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THROUGH THE UN. INDONESIA ADVOCATED A JAKARTA MEETING, INVOLVING FIRSTLY ALL FOUR CAMBODIAN FACTIONS FOLLOWED BY A WIDER MEETING INCLUDING VIETNAM AND ASEAN.
AL ALATAS COMMENTED THAT IN AFGHANISTAN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE MEANS (WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS) BUT NOT ON THE END (FORM OF GOVERNMENT). WITH CAMBODIA A CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED ON THE END (4 PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT) BUT NOONE KNEW HOW TO GET THERE. HE WARNED THAT THIS YEAR'S UN RESOLUTION COULD POSE DIFFICULTIES. VIETNAM COULD ARGUE WITH SOME PLAUSIBILITY THAT
SHE HAD LAUNCHED TALKS (SIHANOUK/HUN SEN), COMMITTED HERSELF TO TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THAT A CRITICAL RESOLUTION WAS THEREFORE
UNJUST ABU HASSAN (MALAYSIA) ADOPTED AN NAM TONE APPEALING FOR A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV AND WARNING THAT, IF OLD FRIENDS FAILED TO DELIVER, MALAYSIA WOULD TURN TO NEW FRIENDS (IE THE RUSSIANS).
6.
MANGLAPUS (PHILIPPINES), IN A SHORT AND WELL ARGUED INTERVENTION, SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO RESTORE THEIR CREDIBILITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. VLADIVOSTOK HAD NOT BEEN
FOLLOWED UP AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR ASEAN'S ZONE OF PEACE PROPOSALS
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