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(221)
see 161743(220)
MDLOAN 7311
Are 22/2
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TO PRIORITY JAKARTA
TELNO 110
OF 04185OZ MAY 88
Q DIST ?
INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, BANGKOK, MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR INFO PRIORITY SINGAPORE, BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, EC POSTS, HONG KONG INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW INFO ROUTINE TOKYO, HANOI
(233)
236
(220
BONN TELNO 416.
EC/ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING: DUESSELDORF: 2-3 MAY POLITICAL DISCUSSION
EAST/WEST, CAMBODIA, AFGHANISTAN
1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE LED FOR THE EC AND STIMULATED A LIVELY DEBATE. HE NOTED THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS WERE CALMER THAN FOR SOME YEARS. GORBACHEV NEEDED A PREDICTABLE AND STABLE FOREIGN POLICY TO GRAPPLE WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, SUCH AS NATIONALITIES. IN ARMENIA/AZERBAYAN, THE OLD STYLE (SENDING IN TROOPS) WAS PLAYED IN TANDEM WITH THE NEW (SOME PRACTICAL CONCESSIONS, MEETINGS WITH ARMENIAN LEADERS). ANOTHER AREA OF TENSION FOR GORBACHEV WAS HOW TO EMBRACE THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION WITH ALL THAT IT IMPLIED FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE (E.G. TRANSPARENCY, PRICE REFORM, CURRENCY REFORM). SHOULD HE REJECT IT OR BE LEFT BEHIND?.
2.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE WONDERED WHETHER AFGHANISTAN SIGNALLED A WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT MISTAKES ELSEWHERE, EG IN ANGOLA, WHERE RESOURCES WERE STRETCHED OR ON ETHIOPIA? WOULD THERE NOW BE PROGRESS IN CAMBODIA? HE COUNSELLED CAUTION IN INTERPRETING SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA AND ELSEWHERE. THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE REMAINED AND THERE HAD BEEN A BUILD UP OF FORCES IN THE PACIFIC. ON CAMBODIA, THERE WERE NO SIGNS YET OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON VIETNAM. THEY WISHED TO WOO ASEAN BUT KEEP THEIR BASES. JAPAN FACED THE USSR WITH A SIMILAR DILEMMA, HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITHOUT ABANDONING VITAL INTERESTS (THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES). WITH CHINA, THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING THE RUNNING BUT THE CHINESE WERE SO FAR RESISTING SOVIET PRESSURE FOR A SUMMIT.
3. DHANABALAN (SINGAPORE), AS LEAD SPEAKER FOR ASEAN, URGED CAUTION ON SOVIET ATTENTIONS. HE POINTED TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE DIALOGUE WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES, BUT TO THEIR CONTINUED INABILITY TO FORGE A CONSTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THE SOVIETS USED AN ADROIT MIXTURE OF DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY
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