CONFIDENTIAL
JAPAN
10.
The Presidency drew attention to Mr Takeshita's visit to three EC countries in May. He hoped that Ambassadors in Tokyo could produce agreed recommendations for how the talks might be handled. The Presidency were anxious to see the emphasis placed on partnership with Japan, in industrial cooperation and investment as well as in the global economic field, rather than on commercial cooperation. He urged others to encourage their Ambassadors in this sense.
11. I gave a short account of the Secretary of State's
impressions following his January visit to Tokyo. I welcomed the Presidency's accent on partnership, as did others.
12.
The Presidency announced that the next Troika consult- ations were due to take place in the margins of the OECD Ministerial meeting on May 18/19. The German Political Director was also planning a visit to Tokyo during which he hoped that Troika consultations on political questions could take place.
13. The Presidency suggested two new European ventures in Japan, a European Exhibition and a European Cultural Year. They distributed an informal German paper (copy attached for FED and CRD) describing these ideas in more detail.
CAMBODIA
14. At the suggestion of the Presidency, Julienne (France) gave а brief account of the present situation, prefacing it with a reminder that while France supported Prince Sihanouk and gave him material help they had not sought to influence his decisions in any way. The French continued to regard Sihanouk as the person most likely to bring about a free and neutral Cambodia. His recent voltes-faces could best be explained as his use of the only means at his disposal to put
pressure on China, the ASEAN countries and Vietnam. The French thought that he had manoeuvred quite skillfully and that as regards the negotiations with the Phnom Penh regime he rather than Hun Sen was in the driving seat. In the French view it remained the European interest to support him.
15.
Noone else had much to contribute. The Dutch raised the question of the possible inclusion of a condemnation of the Pol Pot regime in the resolution about Cambodia currently under consideration by the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Dutch believed that it would be appropriate to have such a reference at a time when the spectre of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge had again been raised. They thought that Sihanouk would welcome it. Everyone else, including the Presidency, was unsighted.
The Presidency were not aware
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