CONFIDENTIAL
step up our efforts to persuade Vietnam to accept back those screened out and to persuade others (resettlement countries and places of first asylum alike) to make similar representations. would also need to lead the international initiatives on resettlement of those now in Hong Kong and of genuine refugees in future with a credible contribution of our own.
Comment
We
9. The above package would, subject to further legal advice, seem to meet any legal commitments we may have under the relevant conventions. On the basis of the Ottawa ICG and of reactions to developments in Thailand it would probably be accpetable to the international community. Provided screening were carried out in accordance with UNHCR guidelines, and possibly with UNHCR involvement, there should be no major problems on that front. package could be a logical development from the current closed camp policy: indeed it could well be argued that the needs of genuine refugees would be better served under the package than now.
The
10.
There are risks whether Hong Kong opts to continue with the status quo or to develop a new initiative. On the former, it seems clear that resettlement offers are set to decline in the medium term. Even if the US were to offer 1000 P6 places their offers are unlikely to extend much further as most arrivals in Hong Kong are North Vietnamese. If Hong Kong were to opt for screening it may be possible to secure international commitments to resettle the majority if not all of those Vietnamese refugees now in Hong Kong, but there is the danger that new arrivals would continue at current levels and those screened out (possible 60%-80% of arrivals) would become a burden on Hong Kong alone, being of no interest to the international community. It is for Hong Kong to judge where they would consider the balance of advantage lies.
11. Implementation of the possible new package would require major domestic and international initiatives. The main selling points would be
(a)
adjusting the 1979 Geneva Conference agreement in the light of changing circumstances; and,
(b)
settling of the current resettlement commitment to be replaced by a continuing commitment for "genuine" refugees only (te those screened on).
The main question mark would be whether Vietnam can be persuaded to accept the return of those screened out, and whether in due course they too would have to be considered for
resettlement.
CONFIDENTIAL