all those who did not qualify for resettlement elsewhere would have
to go back. The Vietnamese understood this. While they are still
prepared to take back only volunteers at this stage, they accepted that this problem will have to be dealt with step by step.
4. It was clear that the Vietnamese would not accept any returns
without some form of reintegration assistance. Their ideas on
reintegration assistance were on a modest scale, in line with UNHCR
precedents elsewhere. UNHCR have discussed a package on these lines
with the Vietnamese and will put proposals to them shortly. The
Vietnamese agreed that returnees should be humanely treated and
subject to monitoring on return. UNHCR's proposals will cover these
aspects.
5.
The Hong Kong Government and UNHCR recently signed a Statement
of Understanding. This provides for a UNHCR role in the screening
and appeals procedure, funding arrangements and liberalisation of
the camps for refugees. Over 1,000 screening interviews have been
carried out but no decisions have yet been announced. It is clear,
however, that only a tiny minority of arrivals will be screened in
as refugees.
6.
This means that the number of refugees in Hong Kong awaiting
resettlement (currently about 15,500) can be regarded as
more-or-less finite number. We are preparing with the Home Office a
joint minute to the Prime Minister proposing an additional UK
resettlement commitment of 1,000 Vietnamese boat people over the
next 2 years. This figure is the lowest that can realistically be expected to draw support from other countries.
7. Emphasis has been laid by the media on the fact that boat people may be returned to Vietnam by force. There have been the anticipated comparisons with the return of the Cossacks to the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State had forewarned the Prime
Minister that the media may attempt to draw emotional and
far-fetched analogies of this kind.
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