CONFIDENTIAL
He did not know if it would succeed but it was worth a try.
M. Martin thought that Prince Sihanouk had done well to stand aloof
from JIM. Mr McLaren agreed taht the Prince had played his cards
well but the JIM would not be a success if the Vietnamese refused to
negotiate with him. He asked M. Martin what he thought the elements
of an agreement might be. M. Martin said that the choice was
between a four and two party coalition. A coaliton between all four
Cambodian factions was preferable but he doubted whether the Khmer
Rouge would accept a prominent role for the Sihanoukists. On the other hand, Hun Sen would probably be prepared to share power with
Prince Sihanouk, though not on an equal footing.
13. M. Martin said that Prince Sihanouk had told the French that he
was ready to see Hun Sen again but that he would have to come with
more than empty words. Prince Sihanouk might also visit the United
States and Bonn as well as the UK later in the year. The Prince was
still interested in the possibility of a role for the UN. The
French Permanent Representative to the UN had reported that the
Secretary-General was very cautious over Cambodia. He felt
uncomfortable about Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the UN and his
special representatibve, Ahmed, was trying to restore better
all-round relations with the various parties to the dispute.
M. Martin thought the UN should play a low profile role, though not
necessarily as sponsor of a conference. Mr McLaren said that we
were keeping an open mind. The UN would in any case have a key role
in the wake of a settlement, notably to coordinate any
reconstruction aid programme and the resettlement of refugees.
14. Returning to the elements of a settlement, Mr McLaren said that
he did not think that a bilateral agreement between Hun Sen and
Prince Sihanouk was realistic. But UK Ministers found their current
policy uncomfortable domestically. There were those who accused HMG
of being supportive of the Khmer Rouge. If the UK backed a
settlement which included the Khmer Rouge, it would be difficult to
defend. It would be easier, however, if Pol Pot and his close
associates were excluded. But it was unrealistic to try to exclude
the Khmer Rouge altogether.
CONET DENTTAT