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on the need to negotiate, but the latter had maintained that
participation would be sufficient to establish Vietnamese and PRK
goodwill. Discussion could bring about a change in the situation in
Phnom Penh, but elections would be necessary before the PRK Government would step down. Prince Sihanouk would be given a high
ranking position in any new Government of reconciliation. M. Martin
had replied that Prince Sihanouk would want power and would not be
content with being a figurehead. Co Thach had replied that he had
friendly feelings towards Prince Sihanouk. However, Hun Sen also
had his sensitivities.
5.
M. Martin said that he had reported his discussion in Hanoi to
Prince Sihanouk on 6 July. The Prince had listened with interest
but by that time he was already furious with the Khmer Rouge, who
had been attacking ANS troops. (Martin commented that the French suspected that Sihanouk's claims were exaggerated.) he had received messages of support from ASEAN, President Reagan and the Japanese Prime Minister. He felt confident and politically strong. Khmer Rouge killings of ANS troops were therefore only part of the reason for his resignation as President of the CGDK. The Prince had judged
that he should distance himself from the CGDK and in particular from
the Khmer Rouge before the JIM started. He also saw his resignation as a means of putting pressure on the Thais and Chinese to sever
their links with the Khmer Rouge.
6. Mr McLaren observed that Prince Sihanouk had succeeded in getting some change in the Chinese position. He had been encouraged by his own talks in Peking recently. The Chinese were evidently not yet ready to abandon the Khmer Rouge but they seemed to understand that Pol Pot and his close associates were unacceptable to the West.
M. Martin said that the Thais were also alive to this. However,
they claimed that Khmer Rouge resistance was still necessary and
Thailand could not affort to offend China.
7. M. Martin continued that Prince Sihanouk's resignation had caused difficulties for Sino/French relations. M. Cheysson had been
in Bangkok when Sihanoul made his announcement and Peking was convinced that the French had put him up to it. The real problem
was the Khmer Rouge. The Chinese would have to choose between them
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