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Sally O'Brien
10 June 1988
SEAD, FCO BKD, FCO
Bangkok Hanoi Peking
61
Hong Kong (for Political Adviser)
CALL ON DICK CHILDRESS, DIRECTOR, ASIAN AFFAIRS, NSC: VIETNAM/CAMBODIA
1.
Peter Thomas (Assistant, SEAD) and I called on Dick Childress on Thursday 9 June. He had just returned from New York where he and General Vessey had met Co Thach. The meeting seemed to have gone well; Childress said the atmospherics were good. The two sides issued a joint statement, attached. The two main develop- ments were; agreement to a technical meeting on POW/MIAS to be held in Hawaii by the end of June and to an experts meeting in Hanoi in July to discuss the resettlement of former re-education camp detainees.
2. Commenting on HMG's change of policy on Vietnamese Boat People landing in Hong Kong, Childress said that the issue of repatriation to Vietnam posed problems. If a political settlement came about in Cambodia and the situation improved in Vietnam, then many boat people would undoubtedly wish to return. But given Vietnam's current internal economic difficulties they would be unlikely to wish to return at the moment. Vietnam was unlikely to want to receive them either. (Thach had said as much to General Vessey). Childress agreed that many of the new arrivals had no claim to refugee status and that this problem had to be addressed effectively: this would require generous resettlement, humane deterrence and international cooperation on improving the situation in Cambodia/Vietnam.
3. Mr Thomas asked Childress how he saw Vietnam's recent announce- ments of troop withdrawal from Cambodia. Childress noted that Thach had said that once the 50,000 troops had left Cambodia, those remaining would be left under Hun Seng. This was a typical Vietnamese ploy to evade international criticism and strengthen Vietnam's negotiating position. While it would be obvious to every- body that they were not giving up control in Cambodia, they would be able to disclaim responsibility for their troops. Furthermore the move focused international attention on the possibility of a Cambodia left in the hands of the Khmer Rouge. The problem of the Khmer Rouge was a real one with no easy solution. Childress volun- teered that the Americans were talking to the Chinese about this, but
CONFIDENTIAL