ཐཱ ན 'P *
I
2
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
The Royal Observatory (RO) is recommended as the
centre to monitor and assess the consequences of
any radiological release from Daya Bay. Factors
influencing this choice are : the RO is manned on a
24 hour basis, has experience in radiation monitoring, and has immediate access to weather
conditions. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5, page 32]
Even with very serious accidents, it is unlikely that unacceptable contamination of the water supply system would eventuate. [Chapter 9, paragraph 9.5,
page 60]
The food pathway is likely to be the principal concern following any serious release of
radioactivity from the Daya Bay plant. [Chapter 9,
paragraph 9.6, page 64]
Although stressing that very large (beyond design
basis) accidents are highly improbable, perhaps impossible, with the type of PWR being constructed at Daya Bay, for completeness such hypothetical accidents are considered. Sheltering in certain
circumstances is recommended : the general
distribution of stable iodine tablets is not. The
possibility of 'hot spots', necessitating temporary relocation, is considered so remote that detailed
planning is not justified. [Chapter 9, paragraph
9.7, pages 65-67]
(x) Extremely large accidents sufficient to cause
significant ground contamination are also considered so unlikely that detailed planning and, in particular, the purchase of expensive
specialized decontamination equipment is not
justified.
[Chapter 9, paragraph 9.8, page 68]