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smooth; but also suspicion that this could work against Hong Kong's interests. More generally, there is a pervasive feeling among parts of the Hong Kong public that HMG lack real commitment to Hong Kong; that we fail to give the territory all the support and assistance it deserves; and that our long-term objectives in China, especially in the commercial field, are given priority over our responsibilities for Hong Kong. Virtually every issue tends to be viewed in this light, however implausibly. Examples which are variously adduced by our critics to support their case include:
the decision to introduce direct elections to LegCo in 1991 rather than 1988;
the limited scale of our resettlement assistance to Vietnamese boat people;
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the hard bargain driven by MOD negotiators on the sharing of defence costs;
the imbalance between British and Hong Kong carriers on the London-Hong Kong air route;
incidents when Hong Kong travellers are refused entry to the UK, or encounter other difficulties with the immigration authorities;
(potentially) our coolness over the idea of a world exhibition in Hong Kong in 1997.
Hong Kong will be looking for reassurance from the Secretary of State that our commitment to the territory and its transition to Chinese sovereignty remains firm; and in particular that Hong Kong's interests are not being subordinated to our wider objectives in relation to China.
9.
Where specific issues covered in the briefing are concerned, the period of public consultation over the first draft of the Basic Law (Brief No 7) has begun: the initial reaction in Hong Kong to this long and complex document has been muted, but the main lines of criticism are beginning to appear and are covered in the briefing.
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