SECRET
FM HONG KONG
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 879
OF 011030Z MARCH 88
HKB
SECRET
145154
MDLIAN 4130
47
020112
MAR 1985
TOP COPY a DIST 7
STIRCTLY PERSONAL FOR HUM, HKD FROM GOVERNOR
YOUR TELNO 506 : UK/HONG KONG BILATERAL ISSUES
I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY WITH LORD GLENARTHUR DURING HIS RECENT VISIT THE PROBLEM OF THE UK/HONG KONG RELATIONSHIP. I MADE THE POINT THAT DESPITE OUR ECONOMIC SUCCESS PEOPLE IN HONG KONG WERE NERVOUS ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND THAT MUCH OF THIS NERVOUSNESS TENDED TO BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UK: IN PARTICULAR THROUGH CRITICISM THAT HMG WAS NOT 'DOING ENOUGH' TO DEFEND HONG KONG'S INTERESTS. THERE WERE OBVIOUS EXAMPLES OF THIS THE WHITE PAPER, VRS, THE DCA. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE THAT WAS NOT LIKELY TO GO AWAY. BUT IT COULD BE ALLEVIATED TO SOME EXTENT BY A DEGREE OF SYMPATHY AND
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IMAGINATION IN HMG'S DEALINGS WITH HONG KONG E.G. LEGCO MEMBERS AND OTHER PROMINENT VISITORS TO LONDON BEING RECEIVED BY MINISTERS, IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR BN (0) PASSPORT HOLDERS.
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2 I ALSO ASKED LORD GLENARTUR WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AREAS IN WHICH THE HKG COULD HANDLE MATTERS BETTER THAN WE DID AT PRESENT. HE SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM HE NOTICED WAS THE CONTINUING SCEPTICISM ABOUT CHINESE INTENTIONS. WE AGREED THAT OVERCOMING THIS WOULD BE A LONG TERM TASK. DAVID GILLMORE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD STRENGHTEN THE HKGO IN LONDON, AND IN PARTICULAR ITS CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE OPINION OUTSIDE WHITEHALL, AND TRY AND GET AS MANY INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE TO VISIT HONG KONG AND SEE IT FOR THEMSELVES. WE SHALL BE PURSUING THESE IDEAS.
3. YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE CONSIDERING IN DUE COURSE THE HANDLING OF LORD GLENARTHUR'S VISIT HERE IN JUNE. HANDLING OF THE PRESS IS LIKELY TO BE A PARTICULAR POINT OF DIFFICULTY. IT IS, I BELIEVE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT LORD GLENARTHUR SHOULD HAVE SOME POSITIVE THINGS TO SAY BOTH TO EXCO AND PUBLICLY. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IS AN AREA ON WHICH HE IS CERTAIN TO BE QUESTIONED CLOSELY. IT WOULD MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE TO THE SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT IF HE WERE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AN ADDITIONAL RESETTLEMENT QUOTE (PARA 3 OF TUR) AND/OR A MAJOR POLICY INITIATIVE TO TACKLE THE LONG-TERM ISSUE OF REPATRIATION.