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29.
that Hong Kong opinion was divided on the question and that, until a consensus emerged, major reforms might well cause instability and a loss of business confidence.
There was something in both these arguments. But there were also other reasons for Chinese concern.
30. First, there is clearly a disposition among many influential Chinese, including important leaders such as DENG Xiaoping, to see constitutional reform as a subtle British plot. Our sudden surge of interest in central constitutional reform in 1984, after well over 100 years of an autocratic system, was seen as a reaction to the failure to preserve a formal British administrative link after 1997 and as an attempt to set up instead a "British-style" system in Hong Kong in which "pro- British elements" would hold key positions. would thereby retain influence in Hong Kong after 1997 and China's exercise of sovereignty would be compromised. Fanciful and paranoid though this is, there is no doubt that it was (and to some extent still is) quite widely believed on the Chinese side.
31.
Britain
Secondly, the Chinese felt bounced by the 1984 review. They had had no time to prepare and respond. It was only after the White Paper had been published that they realised its implications and began to consider how they should deal with the emerging system of representative government. They evidently concluded that they could not stand aside if the issue of political power in Hong Kong might eventually be at stake. They had ignored the first District Board elections in 1982. But through the clandestine Hong Kong branch of the Chinese Communist Party they became actively involved, at short notice, in the elections of March 1985. They managed as a result to secure election to District Boards of a number of their supporters. Thus we saw practical evidence of the thesis familiar since the time of Sir Alexander Grantham: that the cost of direct elections is that they invite, indeed compel, the communists to come out of the closet and into the system, with consequent risks for stability and confidence.
32.
Political developments in China in late 1986, with student demonstrations in favour of vague concepts of greater democracy, led to the downfall of Party Secretary General HU Yaobang and a temporary swing away from reformist policies. This no doubt added to Chinese concerns. Although by the turn of the year, the Chinese seemed reluctantly to accept that the Hong Kong Government were committed to holding a political review in 1987, they were pressing hard for a firm commitment that it should not refer to direct elections to the
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