SWB
FE/0073 C/5
12 Feb 88
USSR CALLS FOR SPEEDY SIGNING OF GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN
Tass in English 1100 gmt 11 Feb 88
Text of report
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov met here [Islamabad] on 10th-11th February with Pakistani President Mohammad Ziaul Haq, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani. Conversations were also held at the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. The conversations focused on the Afghan issue in the light of the recent statement by Mihail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which paved the way for the earliest political settlement of that problem.
Vorontsov conveyed to President Ziaul Haq a message from the Soviet leadership which stressed the importance of the signing as soon as possible of the Geneva documents on the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan.
It was noted that at this moment much depended on what line would be chosen towards the earliest conclusion of the Geneva accords, under which the Afghan people would be able to decide independently on their future, or towards the continuation of senseless confrontation.
The answer to this question, based on the sober assessment of the situation, would for long determine the entire course of events in this part of the Asian continent.
In connection with the fact that the Pakistani leaders acknowledged, on the one hand, during the conversations in Islamabad that Gorbachev's statement was extremely important, but, on the other hand, sought to delay the conclusion of the accords and make this process dependent on the establishment of a new Afghan government, the Soviet side pointed out that the logic of this question was hard to understand.
Internal Afghan settlement was another part of the Afghan problem and it would be undoubtedly easier to find approaches to it once that external factors were removed. Internal settlement in Afghanistan was a matter of the Afghans themselves. It would depend on them alone what paths they would choose. One could and should facilitate this process, but, naturally, not at the expense of the Geneva process.
It was firmly stated to the Pakistani leaders that the Soviet and Afghan sides stood for the Geneva accords, for the signing of the documents in the nearest future. Departing now from the conclusion of the Geneva process would be tantamount to frustrating the entire Afghan settlement. Its consequences would be unpredictable.
The refusal to resolve the external aspects of the Afghan problem would heighten the situation in the country, tense as it was already, and result in a fresh flare-up of the armed conflict and bloodshed.
The current situation was critical, and Pakistan was expected to make the necessary step that would set into motion the Geneva accords.
(A2, A3, B)
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