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13. Option (d), to continue to defer a decision will now be much more difficult to sustain. Sine French hostility to the Treaty is well known and the Chinese may also sign the Protocols we may find ourselves shortly in a position where we are the only NWS not to have defined its position towards the Protocols. An American announcement of non-signature, which will align their policy more closely with the French than ours, would harm our interests in promoting cooperation on security matters with the French as would be seen to be foot dragging on a matter of real concern to them, (as well as being indecisive by the South Pacific States). we delay an announcement of non-signature until after the US have made one, we shall also open ourselves to the change of "poodleism".
14. This leaves us with option (e), under which we would state that we were not prepared to sign any of the Protocols now but would be prepared to reconsider our position when (a) all eligible regional and non-regional States have made their position clear on the Treaty and its Protocols, (b) the question raised by the Soviet statement of whether nuclear transit and ships/aircraft visits have been clarified, and (c) we could consider the outcome of discussion at UNSSD (in 1988 or 1989) on NWFZ to see how the SPNFZT would fit into the picture.
15.
It is likely to take a considerable time, if ever, before there conditions are fulfilled. Option (e) would provide a way of reconciling our interests with the French, while not rebuffing actively the South Pacific States or ignoring our longstanding policy on NWFZ. Our position would be compatible with the US but our rather more positive approach to the SPNFZT should help avoid changes of "poodleism", while we should be able to smoke out the Russians on the underlying intentions in their statement, and the South Pacific States' attitude to the latter.
Conclusions
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16. None of the options discussed above are very attractive. Option (a) is only recommended if we are prepared to defend our decision to support the French position; but it will be taken as a clear sign, by the South Pacific States and others, that downgrading our arms control priorities, and will be resented in the region. Even if the pill were sweetened by adding that we would sign if all States concerned did so, this would not get away from the problem of being seen to put our security interests vis-a-vis the nuclear weapon states above our arms control priorities. An expression of willingness to sign might also be unacceptable to the French. Option (b) runs the risk of arousing French hostility, of charges of inconsistency and of giving rise to pressures from South Pacific States to go further. It could also be embarrassing in the context of our opposition to NWFZS in Europe. Option (c) would be bitterly resented by the French and is not recommended. Option (d) is unlikely to be sustainable for long after a
long after a US announcement, which cannot be delayed for long. In the circumstances option (e) seems the least difficult of all these options. By emphasising the difficult position into which the Soviet statement has put Western
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