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announcement that we would not sign the SPNFZT when there are no obvious arms control/disarmament/security grounds for not doing so would be seen as change in our long-standing policy. We should be criticised by the South Pacific States for allowing our policy to be dictated by the US and France. A situation in which only the USSR and China sign the Protocols, with the West appearing to threaten security in the region, would also be damaging to Western security interests. (It might not even be successful in Mr Shultz' terms, if an announcement that the State decision was not irrevocable caused the French to remain suspicious of our intentions and to continue to lobbying for our support.)
10. One possible ground for not signing Protocol III would be that we were not prepared to enter into an unverifiable regional commitment not to test in the South Pacific as long as our policy remains that insufficient progress has been made with verification of a global test ban. But this would almost certainly be seen as mere casuistry; the arguments about verifying a test ban in the South Pacific would be much simpler than those involved in a global test ban by the 2 Superpowers and in any case there is no indication that any NWS apart from France intends to conduct undeclared nuclear tests in the Pacific region. If, therefore, we were prepared to go along with the US we would have to be candid about our reasons for doing so. This would please the French but annoy the South Pacific States and damage our general stance on disarmament.
11. Option (b), of signature coupled with an indication that HMG do not propose to proceed to early ratification would need further consideration by Legal Advisers of its implication for UK legal doctrine developed in order to justify our refusal to sign UNLOSC. If the option is available, it would involve a legal obligation extending no further than to refrain fram acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Protocols. It would be more consistent with our existing policy than option (a) above. It would receive a better reception from the South Pacific State (particularly if we could hold out the prospect of eventual ratification). The disadvantage would be that a clear act of support for the Protocols would arouse French suspicion that we would ratify in due course; and it would tend to encourage support for NWFZ in Europe.
12. Option (c) has been rejected in the past because although it would be strongly favoured by Australia, New Zealand and other States in the region, the SPNFZT is of limited practical value to us, and would tend to encourage the movement towards NWFZs in Europe (as would option (b)) and primarily for the reason that it would do severe damage to our bilateral relationship with the French. These reasons are still valid. But, assuming we were able to enter reservations on those points in paragraph 8 which are of concern to
a variant on this option might be to express a willingness to sign the Protocols at sometime in the future when (i) all regional states and eligible non-regional States were to sign the Treaty, and the Protocols. The disadvantage would be that since neither the US nor France are willing to sign, our gesture would be seen as mainly symbolic and we would be pressed to give the reasons why, if we were prepared to accept the principle of the SPNFZT, we would not sign
us,
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