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which goes further than that which we are prepared to accept. Although South Pacific Forum representatives have given all assurances that our existing safeguards agreement with the IAEA is sufficient in respect of transfers of Australian uranium to the UK it might be prudent to obtain written clarification on this part were adherence to this Protocol contemplated. (In any event adherence to Protocol I would involve an obligation to conclude a full scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA in respect of Pitcairn within 18 months of ratification.)
(g) The Protocols do not make clear whether Parties to them would be obliged to accept any change in obligations arising from amendments to the Treaty itself or whether they could reject them. Α reservation on this point would be necessary in the event of adherence. The Soviet Union has already made such a reservation and, subject to Legal Adviser's view this should not be insurmountable.
1.
In short, adherence to the Treaty Protocols would raise a number of issues where the implications for UK policy are unclear. But subject to Legal Advisers' views there would not appear to be anything in the Protocols which could not be overcome by suitable reservations and explanations at the time of signature or ratification. Furthermore, our legal advice is that acceptance of the Protocols would not imply acceptance of the aims and principles of the Treaty except in so far as these are reflected in any Protocols we may sign. The prime reason for our reluctance to move towards signature of all or any of the Protocols has been the overriding importance we attach to our bilateral security arrangements with the French.
Options
8.
The main options available to us would now appear to be:- (a) To state that we would not sign the Protocols but that this decision is not irrevocable, perhaps coupled with a statement that UK policy will continue to be in line with the general aims of the SPNFZT;
(b) To sign the Protocols but not to ratify them;
(c) To sign some or all the Treaty Protocols;
(d) To continue with the existing policy of deferring a decision.
(e) A variant on (a) above, whereby we would not sign the Protocols but indicate that we were prepared to so do subject to certain conditions being fulfilled;
9.
Option (a), an announcement that we would not sign the Protocols but that decision was not irrevocable, is that which is now favoured by Mr Shultz. He is not prepared to accept the continuous lobbying by the French and the South Pacific States that a deferment of any decision would entail. But our situation is different from that of the US, in that our policy has for long been to encourage the principle of NWFZ, provided that certain conditions are met. A UK
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