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(b) Protocol II of both the SPNFZT and Tlatelolco both contain provisions for negative security assurances, the effect of which is to prohibit the first use or threaten use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. This goes further than the general undertaking which we gave in 1978 to all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT or other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, viz that we would not use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against them "expect in the case of an attack on the UK, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon State". This undertaking is thus already available to regional States who are NPT members and/or ratify the SPNFZT. would need a change of policy by Ministers, which we would be most unwilling to recommend in view of its implications for our policy on NOFUN in Europe, to ratify Protocol II as it stands. Our legal right to make a reservation under Protocol to ensure that the NSA we gave was consistent with our existing policy is unclear. However the Soviet Union appears to have made such a reservation and the NSA we gave to the Contracting Parties to Tlatelolco was also qualified. Subject to Legal Advisers opinion no insurmountable problems are therefore foreseen
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(c) Adherence to Protocol I and/ or III would involve an undertaking not to test any nuclear explosive device on Pitcairn (Protocol I) or anywhere within the SPNFZ area (Protocol III). We have given similar commitments not to test in the Latin American NWFZ by our ratification of Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We also have no intention ourselves of conducting nuclear tests anywhere South Pacific region. But an expression of support for (let alone signature of) Protocol I would probably and for Protocol III certainly, provoke a very strong French reaction. Our political relationship with France has in fact dominated our attitude to the SPNFZT, and resulted in our present studiously non-committal attitude to it.
(d) The definition of "territory" in the Treaty includes certain phrases which could commit the UK to accept certain aspects of maritime law which we we do not recognise. This problem would need to be circumvented by an explanation of the definition which is acceptable to us.
(e) the meaning of "nuclear explosive device" in the Treaty and Protocols I and II is unclear and could be taken to include nuclear power plants or nuclear powered vessels and equipment, as well as nuclear weapons and so called peaceful nuclear explosions. South Pacific Forum representatives have assured us that only the last 2 meanings are intended. Were we to contemplate adherence to any of the Protocols it would be necessary to put on our record our understanding of the term. Legal Advisers' opinion is required on whether such a procedure could be adopted.
(f) Adherence to Protocol II, Article II of which contains an undertaking not to contribute to any act of a Party which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, could be read as implying an undertaking on our part to accept a nuclear safeguard agreement
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