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passage in the territorial waters; and that all States in the region agree. This pragmatic, case by case, fundamentally positive attitude to NWS is of long standing. We signed the Antartic Treaty in 1959 and were the first eligible State to sign the Additional Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.
5.
How does the SPNFZT measure up to the general principles in the previous paragraph? A truthful answer must be that it will contribute little to disarmament, regional security, and to non-proliferation. All the SPNFZT parties are also NPT members who had aready accepted key non-proliferation obligations in Article III (a) and (b) which are contained in Article III (a) and (b) of the SPNFZT. (The situation among the South Pacific States is therefore quite different from that applying in the Latin American NWFZ) with a mix of NPT - and non - NPT States, with some of the latter possessing a potential nuclear explosives capability. The establishment of the SPNFZT will not contribute directly to disarmament and its effects on security (leaving aside the important issue of nuclear transit and ship/aircraft visits) are marginal. have therefore no specific regional interest in supporting the SPNFZT. Equally we have no reason to oppose it. An announcement that we would not sign the Treaty Protocols, even if this decision were subject to review would be seen as a firm departure from our previous policy. It is true that, France apart, (3) regional States have not signed the SPNFZT but all major States in the region have done so and are enthusiastic about the Treaty. While non- signatory by 3 regional micro-states could provide a peg on which to decline to sign the Protocols it would be unwise to rely on their non-signature for a prolonged period. This would not constitute a very convincing reason for UK non-signature in any case.
6.
Apart from these general considerations, we have a number of specific concerns arising from the wording of the Treaty and the Protocols:-
We
In
(a) The definition in Article I of the Treaty of "stationing" nuclear explosive devices goes wider than the equivalent provision in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It could affect us in two ways; in relation to the prohibition on "stationing" of nuclear explosive devices under Protocol I and the rights of nuclear weapon transit and/all/ships/aircrafts visits which we would enjoy in the rest of the SPNFZT zone. On the other hand Article V of the Treaty also provides that each Party is free to decide policy on foreign ships/aircraft visits and navigation in its territorial waters. response to the Russian statement, Australia has alreay made it clear that the Treaty "in no practical way" impeded Australia's ability to cooperate with its Allies or to contribute to the maintenance of stable nuclear deterrence. This might provide us with a means of reaching satisfactory arrangements for nuclear ship visits etc with the States concerned without major difficulties, and for an acceptable definition of "stationing" in respect of Pitcairn, were this to be needed. However while the definition on this crucial issue is imprecise, in any general statement we would need to put down a marker on this point.
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