CONFIDENTIAL
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY (SPNZFT)
Current Position
1. FCO and MoD Ministers agreed in August 1986 that our policy should be to delay signature to the Protocols to the SPNFZT, when these were published but to maintain contact over them with the South Pacific States, the French and the US. Subsequently we have informed all 3 states, individually, most recently in a letter from the Secretary of State in response to one from the Australian Foreign Minister urging us to sign the Protocols that we were studying them, that we would want to be in touch subsequently with them and that no early decision was to be expected.
2. This position was sustainable in public, and with the US and South Pacific States without difficultly as long as:-
(a) No significant time had passed between the formal tranmission of the Protocols to the potential signatories. (This happened in [October]) and
UK
(b) No NWS had formally announced its position on signature. public and parliamentary interest in the SPNFZT has been minimal. But a new situation has arisen as a result of:-
(i) Soviet signature of the Protocols which they are eligible to sign (Protocols 2 and 3). This was accompanied by the statement, the legal status of which is unclear that nuclear weapons transit and nuclear capable ships/aircrafts visits are inconsistent with the nuclear weapon free status of the SPNFZT area; and an apparent reservation on the extent of the Soviet assurances under Protocol II not to use/threaten to use nuclear weapons against states parties; (ii) Mr Shultz intention to announce that the US will not sign Protocols but that this decision could be reviewed in future, perhaps coupled with a statement that US policy will continue to be in line with the Treaty. An announcement on this line has not yet been agreed within the US Administration; the Department of Defense want to say that the US decision is final and will apply to all future NWFZ proposals. We have recommended that the Secretary of State seeks a commitment for full consultations with us before any US statement is made when he meets Mr Shultz on 6/7 January.
3. A review of the available options is therefore urgently necessary so that we can consult with the US in a reasonably short time. Once there is agreement within the US administration on the terms of an announcement (which we might wish to influence), they are unlikely to want to wait long before going ahead with it.
UK attitudes towards NWFZ and the SPNFZT
4. Our stated policy of NWFZs is that their establishment in certain parts of the world could contribute to regional security, non-proliferation and to disarmament in general. This is however conditioned upon nuclear weapons not already featured in the security of the region concerned, that a balance of security will be maintained; that they do not interfere with generally established principles of navigation on the high seas and the right to innocent
CONFIDENTIAL