CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
America, and would risk provoking questions in the UK as
to why we would not sign, to which we could not give
politically acceptable answers. While therefore our
position must remain in line with that of the US and
France it will need to be rather more forthcoming, on NWFZ
than either.
7. Against these considerations, option (a) carries the
risk of political criticism in the UK and of further
pressure to sign the Protocols. Option (b) above would
postpone our giving effect to our undertakings under the
Protocols but would risk heavy French criticism for
having supported them by signature, and further lobbying
from regional States. Option (c) would anger the French
and is not recommended.
Option (a) of continuing to
delay a decision will become increasingly difficult to
maintain for the reasons in para 4 above. (The US
themselves are not prepared to delay a decision and the mouth, bont following the tech
indefninitely.)-
the teenstang g
svin Shultz, indi not announce a duetion, wil
Aeon ette te comme cov
composition.)
was mlewevent wadh
we love them inform
8. This leaves option (e), an announcement of
non-signature coupled with an expression of intent to
conform with the objectives of the Protocols, and to
keep our policy on signature under review in the light of
a number of factors. The basic decision not to sign
will be welcome to the US and France, while the
accompanying assurances imply-no-fundamental change-in our position-on-NWFZ-while leaving open the possibility of a change in our position will help reduce the disappointment of the regional States. We can also give
CONFIDENTIAL