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position, if those of all other NWS were known.
5.
Officials have therefore considered 5 options:-
(a) To state that we will not sign the Protocols but
that the decision is not irrevocable, coupled with a
declaration that our policy will continue to conform with
-
the objectives of the SPNFZT. This is the position that
we understand is favoured by Mr Shultz, although he has
yet to persuade Mr Weinberger, who favours ruling out US
signature, or support any future NWFZ proposals;
(b) To sign the proposals, but not to ratify them;
(c) To sign and ratify some or all of the Protocols;
(a) To maintain our current policy of postponing a
decision;
(e) To announce that we are not yet prepared to sign the
Protocols, but that our policy will continue to conform
with their objectives, and we are ready to review our
position in the light of the factors in para 2(d) above.
Mr Devoll Tomas'
6. As was pointed out in our (earlier submission, the
SPNFZT will not make a signifcant contribution to either
non-proliferation of disarmament"
-
key regional States
are already NPT-parties and it could generate unwelcome
momentum for NWFZs in other areas We have hitherto
taken the view that our shared security interests with
the US and France as NWS out weigh the disappointment which are non-signature will cause the South Pacific
States. But a flat UK rejection of the Treaty would be
as a clear departure from our longstanding policy
which has lead us to support NWFZ in Antartica and Latin
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