hnology. This had said that the Hong Kong Coliseum had probably been the most complex structure ever attempted Hong Kong. The design had been totally impractical. The report had said that no attempt had been made to ease the problems of construction, nor had the engineer warned the tenderer of the problems of construction. The report had noted that the design had not been prepared with a view to rapid and continuous construction and the contractor had not received a comprehensive set of detailed drawings at the start of construction. The report had concluded that it had been physically impossible to complete the project within the specified contract period and that the consequent delays had not been due to the default of the contractor.
7.35 The superstructure contractor said that a certificate (see footnote) had been issued by the Government extending the time of completion to the last day of the construction. If there had been insufficient work, organization or experience on his part the fault would have lain with him and such an extension would not have been granted. The extension of time fully supported the statement categorically made by the Director of Architectural Services at the first hearing that the actual contract period after the extension of time was the true period required for the construction of this project. 7.36 The superstructure contractor said that he had bid for the contract on the basis of the bills of quantity which specified the amount of work and the amount of materials to be used. He had completed the Prince of Wales Building project for the Public Works Department on behalf of the British Armed Forces. Detailed drawings had then been issued in stages as construction progressed and when required. Similar arrangements had been expected for the Hong Kong Coliseum project. He had pressed the Government for detailed drawings for the Hong Kong Coliseum but they had been slow in coming. There had been insufficient manpower to supply the detailed drawings and also the changes in scope. Moreover, the engineer who had designed the project had retired after the award of the contract and his successor had not known as much about the concept as his predecessor.
7.37 The superstructure contractor said that other than the late issue of drawings, changes in scope of the project such as the inclusion of the ice-skating rink had affected the critical path. The additional works represented fifty-four percent of the original contract.
7.38 The superstructure contractor said that there had been no repetitive work in this project. This had ruled out mass production techniques. Changes in scope of the project had also brought work to a halt at various times. These problems could not have been identified in advance because of the lack of drawings. Work had to be stopped, and the labour redeployed, whilst the problem was being solved.
7.39 Conclusions and Recommendations. The Committee are concerned at the delay in the completion of the project and the payment of claims totalling $18 million arising primarily from the underestimation of the complexity of the structure and late changes in the scope of the project. The Committee note that the lack of detailed drawings interfered with the superstructure contractor's programme and prevented the most efficient deployment of labour. The Committee also note the contention of the Director of Architectural Services that the superstructure contractor was lacking in organization although the Director did not elaborate upon this in his evidence. The Committee further note the superstructure contractor's rebuttal of this contention.
7.40 The Committee note that this project was unique and without precedent in Hong Kong and probably in the world. The Committee conclude that the difficulties arose primarily from lack of experience in work of this nature. The difficulties were therefore not anticipated and the delays followed from these difficulties. This was a failure of experience rather than expertise.
7.41 The Committee recommend that detailed consideration should be given to the difficulties and complexity inherent in the construction of a project involving a special design and that sufficient time should be allowed for the completion of the works.
7.42 The Committee recommend that a prequalification of contractors should always be considered for projects involving a special or complex design.
7.43 The Committee recommend that major changes in the scope of a project should generally be avoided after the letting of a contract but where they are proposed, an assessment of the consequential costs should always be made and brought to the attention of the approving authorities.
7.44 The Committee also recommend that where the client is a financially autonomous body, such as the Urban Council, the Government should at the outset reach an agreement with the client whereby the latter undertakes to bear all direct and consequential costs arising from major changes in the scope of a project.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT
7.45 Paragraphs 78–86. Low efficiency in the Correctional Services Industries (CSI) of the Correctional Services Department. The Secretary for Security maintained that productivity was adequate given that many of the objectives of the Correctional Services Industries (CSI), including keeping the prisoners gainfully occupied, teaching people who lacked the self discipline to work and teaching them skills, were not necessarily commercial. Producing manufactured goods for the Government was only subsidiary to these objectives. Nevertheless virtually anything that the prisoners produced represented a profit to the Government. He agreed that the more productive the CSI were the better.
Footnote: A copy was presented to the Committee.
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