the ambit of the policy. The second is that although it fell within the ambit of the policy, an exception was justified in t case. Whatever the explanation, however, the Committee believe that the advice of the Executive Council should have been sought in this case, noting that there was a potential cost to the Government of $8 million.
6.90 The Committee recommend that in all cases of such doubt or where departure from the policy set by the Governor in Council is required because of exceptional circumstances, the advice of the Executive Council should be sought.
6.91 The Committee note the implication arising from this case that there is less justification for a policy of this nature in the case of large-scale projects and correspondingly greater justification in the case of small-scale projects. The Committee question the logic of this assumption, given that the developer in a large-scale project is likely to be able to absorb the cost of providing GIC facilities more easily than a developer of a small-scale project. The Committee note that the present policy as approved by the Governor in Council makes no distinction between the size of projects. 6.92 The Committee note that the policy on the provision of GIC facilities in private development projects is being reviewed and that this should be completed by March 1987. The Committee wish to be informed of the progress and the outcome of the review.
7 GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT
7.1 Paragraphs 136–145. Water leakage in the basement of the Queen Elizabeth Stadium soon after completion resulting in estimated additional costs of $1.9 million. The Committee held hearings on 26 November 1986 (when the witness was the Director of Architectural Services) and on 18 December 1986 (when the witness was the consultancy firm).
7.2 First hearing. The Committee asked the Director of Architectural Services whether the consultants' waterproofing design which relied very heavily on the construction methods adopted was an acceptable alternative to conventional tanking by rock asphalt. The Director of Architectural Services said that there were only two construction methods available in Hong Kong for waterproofing: waterproofed concrete or tanking. The decision to use waterproofed concrete was probably correct. The consultants' design had been cheaper and quicker to construct. The site had been dry with no evidence that the water table was high. Had tanking been used, 325 square metres of basement space would have been lost with the probable sacrifice of facilities. It would have taken at least six months longer to build and would have cost some $4.8 million more. As the Government had spent only $2 million on remedial works, it had still spent $2.8 million less than it would have done on tanking by rock asphalt. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that conventional tanking would have prevented leakage. Had water leakage then occurred, it would have been difficult to locate and remedy.
7.3 The Committee recalled that the consultants had insisted on strict adherence to the design and tender specifications after having been informed by the contractor that the waterproofed concrete might not be able to restrain leakage of underground water. The Director said that there had been no signs on site of conditions which might have warranted a re-think. As the works were already in progress, a change at that time would have entailed a complete revision of the design. Apparently the consultants had had confidence in their design and in the contract specifications.
7.4 The Director said that his staff were probably aware of the contractor's difficulties as the contractor had made these known to the consultants. However his staff had been reluctant to interfere because the design had been acceptable in theory, and achievable. Excessive interference would have removed responsibility from both the consultants and the contractor.
7.5 The Director did not agree with the consultants' claim that the normal degree of supervision by them was not necessary as the project had had full-time supervision by the Government site staff. He did agree with the conclusion of the investigation report which had also rejected the claim. There were two levels of supervision, professional supervision and site supervision. Professional supervision dealt with the design and the final product of the design, whereas site supervision was to ensure that the contractor worked according to the specification. Prima facie there had been negligence on the part of the consultants.
7.6 The Director was not 'overly joyous' about the way the consultants had responded to requests and to the situation. This was more a question of attitude rather than of technical competence or professional judgement.
7.7 Of the eight basements in Hong Kong built by the Government, five had been built with waterproofed concrete. These had proved that the design was workable. The flooding of four 38-litre buckets a day amounted only to 0.0000263 litre per minute per square metre. Success or failure was a relative matter. (See footnote) It was well known in the building industry that underground waterproofing was difficult. However, in the light of the lack of guidance given to the contractor, the Director agreed that the performance of the consultants had not been entirely satisfactory.
7.8 The Director said that a decision had been made at that time not to take legal action against the consultants. There had been factors which might have affected the success of the case. Recent legal opinion had confirmed that legal action against the consultants for negligence should not be pursued.
Footnote: The Director of Architectural Services later informed the Committee in writing that the area requiring remedial works amounted to
about 17.5% of the whole basement.
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