ese countries are very poor indeed:
in 1985, their GNP per head
was only about $280, less than one-fifth of that in the middle income debtor countries. And they are getting poorer. In many cases, their GNP per head is actually lower, in real terms, than it was twenty years ago.
Unlike the major debtors of Latin America, the poorest and most heavily indebted countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have no chance whatever of returning to viability by their own efforts. Although the amount of debt per head of population may be a good deal lower than in the middle income debtors, the ratio of debt to national income is much higher. And their problems are getting steadily worse. Sub-Saharan Africa's debt has risen by well over
70 per cent since 1980, while its exports are even lower now, in dollar terms, than they were then.
There is certainly a a great deal of scope for the Sub-Saharan countries to start to improve the health of their own economies. And that they must do. But that by itself will not be enough to reduce their debt burden.
At the same time, in contrast to the middle-income debtors, two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan African countries' debt is owed to other governments and to international institutions, rather than to the commercial banks. Responsibility for tackling this side of the debt problem therefore lies fairly and squarely with governments. And just as I expect the banks to face up to their responsibilities for the middle income debtors, so governments must do the same for these very poor countries.
That is why I proposed, in Washington last April, a three point international plan to support those of the poorest and most heavily-indebted Sub-Saharan African countries which are pursuing satisfactory economic policies.
First, the creditor nations should convert aid loans into
outright grants.
!
- 4
1