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would still require it to maintain the capability to act in support of the HKG, i.e. MACA and MACP - roles for which British troops are prepared wherever they serve. The force must not only possess the capability, there must be no doubt about its commitment and effectiveness. Furthermore, in the event of serious IS unrest, there may be a need for HMG to demonstrate sovereignty. In this context, it may be necessary to underline HMG's resolve by deploying the force on to the border to deter
Chinese interference.
42.
Operational Deployment.
In the 'worst case scenario', the 2 + 1 force would provide the flexibility of 2 deployment options:
a.
(1)
Traditional IS Option. In the traditional IS Police Force support role, 2 battalions could deploy to Hong Kong Island and Kowloon respectively. The third 'Brunei' battalion could deploy to the New
Territories or remain in reserve in Kowloon.
(2) Consolidated Option. In the consolidated option, one battalion could deploy to the border to relieve the PTU for IS duties. A second battalion could deploy to safeguard Kai Tak airport, other reinforcement assets, the seat of Government and vital communications links, thereby releasing more Police. The third
battalion could deploy as an IS reserve.
b. In the event of the Sovereign Force being reduced to one resident battalion group the feasibility of these options in the face of a threat warranting military involvement would be reduced. Should the Brunei battalion
not be available, the risks inherent in a single battalion group deployment would be increased still further.
43. Flexibility. The Sovereign Force option has to be
sufficiently flexible to permit rapid readjustment to meet changing circumstances, or to cater for unforeseen problems
COS S/184 (2)
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