SECRET
www
terms the retention of the full 1987-level 4 battalion garrison until 1997. This would allow for any shortfalls in Police expansion plans and provide a large, effective military presence able to deal with any level of disorder. It would also serve to underpin a newly constituted Police force - and thus provide a large insurance policy of considerable deterrence value. It would demonstrate HMG's commitment to Hong Kong and would almost certainly meet with the approval of the PRCG. On the other hand, such a large and long term presence would seriously weaken the credibility of the Police and could encourage the PRCG to fill the vacuum with an equally large PLA presence after the garrison's final withdrawal. It would require double -funding with the parallel expansion of the Police at a
This time of possibly greater financial stringency.
It is option is not supported by the HKG, FCO or MOD. not therefore considered further - although there is always the possibility that this may be the option which the PRCG would seek to persuade us to adopt.
b. The 'Zero' Option. The rationale for an early total withdrawal is that, once an expanded Police force has taken. over all remaining military tasks, there should be no military
Such role for a garrison; therefore it should be withdrawn. an early withdrawal would serve to demonstrate confidence in
and the Police, avoid any double-funding by the HKG, provide less justification for a large PLA presence post-1997. These are all factors which attract some sympathy from the HKG. However, in view of the uncertainties that must always exist when looking so far ahead, this option involves higher political risks than Option a. It could be (mis) interpreted as premature abrogation of the UK's commitment towards Hong Kong, and the precipitate withdrawal of the military
Of force could in itself contribute to instability. greater concern is the prospect that a serious breakdown of law and order would require major reinforcement from the UK. The unique circumstances of Hong Kong make the
The effectiveness reinforcement option militarily untenable.
16
COS S/184 (2)
SECRET