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further discussions with the PRCG; such a delay must be avoided if at all possible. Moreover, the Police have to develop new facilities and programmes to more than double the size of the PTU annual throughput and to train units for border duties. The MOD plan must be sufficiently flexible to allow for slippage of the Police expansion plan.
GENERAL
GARRISON OPTIONS
37. Whilst it may be possible to predict events in Hong Kong over the next five years with some degree of accuracy, the picture after about 1992 is clouded by imponderables. Reinvestment trends, police recruiting/retention, the effects of the promulgation of the Basic Law, and many other factors could dramatically affect the smooth passage of transition. Under these circumtances it would be unwise to make over firm plans now - especially for the last five years or so up to 1997. Nevertheless, some guidance is required to allow Long Term Costings (LTCs) and future planning to proceed. To this end several options are considered below from which an outline Military Withdrawal Plan agreed by the Hong Kong Steering Committee - has been formulated.
OPTIONS
38. The options for the provision of a future garrison are wide-ranging. At one extreme the UK could maintain the post-1987 military garrison of 4 infantry battalions, with suitable naval and air components, in support of the expanded RHKP until 1997. On the other hand, the entire military garrison could in theory be withdrawn early, being replaced by an expanded Police force responsible for the security of Hong Kong up to and after 1997. There are middle course options and all are discussed
below:
The Full Garrison Option. Given some of the possible scenarios for disturbance in the final years of transition, it is possible to justify in purely military troops-to-task
a.
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COS S/184 (2)
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