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in the Police's ability to fulfil their internal security duties
and to fear that Peking could claim the shortfall should be filled by PLA forces stationed in Hong Kong. A pre-eminent concern of the HKG is that the Chinese may envisage that a PLA
garrison in Hong Kong after 1997 would, in addition to its responsibility for external defence, act as a deterrent to internal
security disorders. In reaching such a view, the HKG judge that
a factor which the Chinese would consider would be the extent to
which public order before 1997 appeared to depend on the British
Garrison. The HKG believe that an essential part of British
policy must therefore be to give the Chinese the minimum scope
for justifying a significant PLA presence after 1997. The HKG also consider that, after the completion of the Police expansion programme, it will be important for HMG to demonstrate - to
the PRCG and to the Hong Kong public British confidence in the capability of the Police to maintain public order without
reliance on any Garrison, either British or PLA. The HKG judge
that this visible expression of confidence in the Police will
make an important contribution to the maintenance of Police
morale.
31. The HKG concur with HMG's assessment of what China may want, but do not believe that the expectations of the PRCG should be accepted as the final arbiter in this regard. In
addition, HKG believe it will be important to demonstrate to the Chinese that a smooth transition in Hong Kong can only be
achieved by the maintenance of confidence in China's commitment
to allow Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy after 1997. HMG and the HKG must be seen to rely on political and economic policies to maintain stability and avoid turbulence, and on
the Police to contain such trouble as might occur. The HKG stress that the use of UK or Gurkha forces against the
civilian population of Hong Kong in the 1990s would be highly
provocative to that population and could exacerbate rather
than calm any disturbance. The HKG considers that the Garrison
could never be used as a substitute for the Police, and that if public security ever deteriorated to the point where military force had to be used to support the Police in quelling disturbances,
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