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27. The FCO concludes that, if this assessment is correct, the Chinese will wish and expect HMG to provide a guarantee of internal security by maintaining up to 1997 a significant military presence in Hong Kong, and a real ability to influence events on the ground in the event of serious prolonged instability. If there was serious unrest at any time before 1997, they would look to HMG to deal with it, using military force if necessary. If the circumstances required the use of UK forces, the FCO judges that the Chinese would expect and even welcome - such action. It is believed that the Chinese would be most reluctant to intervene militarily themselves before 1997, calculating that such action would destroy confidence and any prospect of a future for Hong Kong of the nature envisaged in the Joint
Declaration.
28.
Decisions regarding any Chinese military presence in Hong Kong after 1997 are entirely a matter for the PRCG, whose intentions are not known. However, it seems certain that there will be a PLA presence, partly for political and symbolic reasons and partly for deployment if the SARG is unable to cope with IS problems which may develop. However, the FCO judges that "the scale of the British presence immediately pre-1997 will not directly determine that of the PLA thereafter", because China's political and military requirements are different from those of the UK. Nevertheless, the FCO considers it would be advantageous, subject to the prevailing situation, to taper down the British presence in the last years. This would weaken the pretext for China to establish a PLA presence comparable to that of the British garrison at the time of its full deployment. It is relevant that Chinese military reinforcement for the SAR Police could be deployed from China in a matter of hours. The FCO believes that the Chinese will be conscious of the fears which the basing of PLA forces in strength in the SAR will arouse. They suggest that Chinese confidence in the ability of the expanded Hong Kong Police force to maintain public order without calling on the resident British garrison could influence the size of the initial Chinese military
presence.
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9
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COS S/184 (2)