election in 1988 outnumber by a considerable margin those who are opposed. Opposition to direct elections has been assessed at between 10 per cent and 25 per cent of respondents, while between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of those questioned support direct election next year.
If confirmed by the Survey Office's own polls, this would be a very large majority indeed, representing
demand for reform which it would be difficult for the British and Hong Kong governments to repudiate.
China's Hand
It is this evidence that has given the edge to reports that, directly and indirectly, Beijing has been using its influence to organise opposition to direct elections next year. While the leadership in Beijing have not said that they are opposed to elections in principle, as we reported in Hong Kong Link 6 they have made very clear to London and to Hong Kong that they do not wish to see direct elections introduced before the Basic Law is agreed and promulgated in other words, before 1990.
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It is not known how many of the 130,000 submissions received by the Survey Office declared against direct election or how many called for it. But a spate of reports implicating pro- Beijing groups in various forms of manipulation appeared in Hong Kong's press during August and September. The most embarressing incident occurred when it was revealed that executives from the Bank of China had 'encouraged' the bank's 10,000 employees to oppose direct elections, and had organised lectures for middle- level management designed to set out China's point of view. The Bank of China appears to have been only one of many institutions closely associated with Beijing to have gone to these lengths.
The mood hardened as the consultation process proceeded, and well-known advocates of direct election were heckled and abused at public meetings
and reportedly, threatened.
even,
The October issue of the Chinese- language magazine The Nineties described in detail the lobbying process which Chinese officials are believed to have promoted. The magazine demonstrated that an article written for Tai Kung Po by Mr Li Nin San was almost identical with the wording of part of an internal policy statement, opposing direct elections in 1988, which has been circulating in pro- Beijing circles. The document is written in simplified characters and in large print a form which is
characteristically used by the Chinese leadership. Mr Li Nin San, president of the Federation of New Territory Associations and a member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, sits on the National People's Council.
Britain
The direction of British policy remains unclear, though many observers in Hong Kong consider Britain's role will be critical. The question of direct elections was discussed, apparently extensively, during the Joint Liaison Group meeting held in London on 8-10 July. At that meeting, Chinese officials appear to have pressed their demand that no reform should be introduced before the Basic Law is promulgated. Some observers attached significance to the ambiguous speech that Lydia Dunn senior member of LegCo and close to British thinking delivered during the debate on the Green Paper in July. Earlier in the year she had affirmed that she favoured direct elections. Most of her speech was again in favour, and appeared to be at odds with her conclusion. In the words of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Miss Dunn ‘demolished all the arguments against direct elections but said Hong Kong should wait a few more years' (17.09.87).
Finally, one week after consultation ended on September 31, the Governor himself entered the debate, albeit enigmatically. Sir David Wilson is believed to harbour liberal views; but, having observed the most careful silence throughout the consultation period, he was still not willing to reveal his hand when he opened the new session of the Legislative Council on October 7. Dampening the hopes of those in favour of direct elections, he said merely that the Hong Kong government would take 'full account' of public views on democratisation but would have to give equal regard to 'other relevant factors' (Financial Times 8.10.87).
Battle Lost, War Won?
Privately, many of those who have been campaigning most energetically for direct elections have conceded that they are unlikely to succeed in 1988. The cost to Hong Kong of such a delay is, of course, impossible to estimate. But few of the principal actors have increased their stock with the public. China is likely to be seen to have attempted to steal by manipulation what it could not secure by consent. Britain (and the Hong Kong government) may have won the grudging respect of opponents for the wily (if not duplicitous) manner with which it has played its cards but has
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probably shed yet more of its waning authority in the territory. The busi community appears to have demonstrated once again its overwhelming attachment to short- term self-interest. And the act s and grassroots organisations will have notched up another defeat.
However, this may only be the short- term account. In the long term, the most striking change to have occurred is that within Hong Kong there is no longer a serious debate about the desirability of introducing direct elections to the Legislative Council. The argument is now about timing, and about the proportion of seats which should be directly elected. If the 'democrats' in Hong Kong are disappointed at their failure to win direct elections next year if they have failed - they should take comfort from reflecting that they have carried the debate, and the 'consensus' within Hong Kong, several stages further.
Many will say that if direct elections are not introduced until after 1990 Hong Kong will not have time to establish a 'democratic' tradition before sovereignty is transferred in 1997. But that may be a rather static view of the process through which Hong Kong and its powerful guardians in Beijing and London are passing. Those who are most seriously committed to political reform who have been arguing for direct elections for many years
are no longer working with the fixed date of 1997 in mind. Their thoughts are on the much longer transition process which is set out in the Sino-British Agreement, and which will be re-affirmed by the Basic Law now being drafted. 1997 is of course a critical date, because it marks the end of the period in which reforms can be introduced under British administration: for those who expect to remain in Hong Kong, however, 1997 can as accurately be described as the beginning of another stage of the transition, no less important, during which reform must be introduced within the context of the Basic Law.
For these people, the demand for not democratic accountability is selective. It is as desirable under either system. If they have succeeded in demonstrating beyond question that the very great majority of people in Hong Kong wish to elect their representatives within the Legislative Council, the 'democrats' have established a political idea which will remain as relevant for them after 1997 as it is now.