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(III)
(IV)
DEPEND ON WHETHER THIS ASSESSMENT WAS WIDELY SHARED. AT
THE VERY LEAST THERE WOULD BE FIERCE CRITICISM FROM THE
PRO-DIRECT ELECTION LOBBY THAT WE HAD AVOIDED THE ISSUE
AND FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF HONG KONG
PEOPLE AND STAND UP TO CHINESE.
WE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT A MAJORITY OF HONG KONG PEOPLE
FAVOURED DIRECT ELECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT IN VIEW
OF THE CONTINUING DIVISION OF OPINION ON WHETHER THE
TIME WAS RIPE FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IT WOULD BE BEST IF
THEY WERE NOT INTRODUCED IN 1988. WE MIGHT SET A FUTURE
DATE FOR THEIR INTRODUCTION OR LEAVE THIS FOR SUBSEQUENT
DECISION. SUCH AN OUTCOME (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) MIGHT,
DEPENDING ON THE BALANCE AND STRENGTH OF OPINIONS
EXPRESSED, BE POLITICALLY TENABLE IN HONG KONG, GIVEN THE
TENDENCY OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE TO SEEK COMPROMISE AND
AVOID CONFRONTATION. BUT THERE ARE CLEARLY THE SAME
DANGERS TO THE CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF HMG AND THE
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT. THE PROSPECT OF A DIRECT CLASH
WITH THE CHINESE WOULD BE REDUCED. IT WOULD HOWEVER
STILL BE NECESSARY TO ORCHESTRATE WITH THEM, IN ADVANCE,
SOME FORM OF PARALLEL CONCLUSION WITHIN THE BLDC SO AS TO
AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE FORCING ITS HAND.
WE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT HONG KONG OPINION CLEARLY FAVOURED
THE INTRODUCTION IN 1988 OF A SMALL DIRECTLY ELECTED
ELEMENT IN LEGCO. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD HAVE TO PERSUADE
THE CHINESE TO GO ALONG WITH SUCH A CONCLUSION IN THE
WHITE PAPER. AGAIN THIS WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE A
STATEMENT OF INTENT BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE
BLDC WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT POST-1997 ARRANGEMENTS
WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE WHICH WE ENVISAGED FOR LEGCO
IN 1988. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN ASSUMPTION ON BOTH THE
BRITISH AND CHINESE SIDES THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CHANGES
WOULD NEED TO FALL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF THE BASIC
LAW, ONCE THESE HAD BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED. IT IS NOT
INCONCEIVABLE THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME COULD BE ACHIEVED, BUT
IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. IT IS LIKELY THAT PERSONAL
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