(E)

TO DECIDE WHETHER A PETITION OR MOTION, WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR TAXATION OR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, MAY BE PRESENTED TO OR MOVED IN THE COUNCIL:

(F) TO REQUIRE THE ATTENDANCE OF PERSONS TO GIVE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COUNCIL OR A COMMITTEE :

(G)

11.

TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

THERE IS NO SPECIFIC PROVISION IN THE JOINT DECLARATION FOR IF HE IS TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO RETAIN SUCH POWERS. HOWEVER, FULFILL EFFECTIVELY HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS OVERALL HEAD OF THE SAR GOVERNMENT IT MAY BE DESIRABLE FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO RETAIN SOME OF THESE POWERS WHETHER OR NOT HE REMAINS THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. ITEMS (A) AND (G) WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND ARE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW. WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT.

POWERS WITH REGARD TO LEGISLATION

ITEM (E)

12. TO ENSURE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IS NOT UNDERMINED AS A RESULT OF THE LEGISLATURE HAVING AN UNFETTERED POWER TO ENACT LEGISLATION, A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES MIGHT BE DESIRABLE. THIS MIGHT PROVIDE THAT BILLS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE

AND SHOULD BE SIGNED AND PROMULGATED BY THE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE MAY RETURN A BILL TO THE LEGISLATURE FOR RE-CONSIDERATION IF HE CONSIDERS THAT ITS ENACTMENT WOULD NOT BE IN THE OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE SAR. IT MIGHT ALSO PROVIDE, IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION, THAT IF THE BILL WERE ENACTED AGAIN WITH THE SUPPORT OF AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SIGN IT, EVEN IF IT WERE IN A FORM WHICH DID NOT TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS VIEWS.

POWERS TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATURE

13. AS A FURTHER CHECK, IT MAY ALSO BE DESI ARABLE FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO RETAIN THE POWER TO DISSOLVE THE LEGISLATURE, AFTER CONSULTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES COUNCIL, IF THE LEGISLATURE PERSISTENTLY:

(A) DECLINED TO SUPPORT POLICIES, VOTE FUNDS OR ENACT LEGISLATION CONSIDERED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO BE NECESSARY FOR THE GOOD GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SAR: OR

(B) SOUGHT TO HAVE LEGISLATION ENACTED WHICH WAS CONSIDERED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO THE GOOD GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SAR.

14.

THE BASIC LAW MIGHT ALSO PROVIDE THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT THE

TUC APPROPRIATION BILL, OR IT CANNOT

10CDOVE

13IT UNFETTERED

NPC ROLE:

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