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(D) PARAGRAPH 3 (C) : EXCO WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ON THIS POINT AND DID NOT WISH TO PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BEING ABLE TO OVERRULE, UNILATERALLY, A DECISION OF THE COURTS. WE SEE A NEED TO THINK THIS THROUGH FURTHER AND WOULD THUS PREFER TO EXCLUDE THE POWER OF PARDON AT THIS STAGE. IT IS A POINT OF DETAIL WHICH THERE IS NO NEED FOR US TO COVER IN THIS EXERCISE.
(E) PARAGRAPH 4: WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO INCLUDE A POWER OF REMOVAL BECAUSE THE THRUST OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS TO MAINTAIN A SYSTEM SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT ONE. THE PRESENT LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, OF COURSE, DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO REMOVE THE GOVERNOR. FURTHER AS A GENERAL POINT, WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO DRAW TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A POWER AT THIS STAGE. THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVAL UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES IS OF COURSE, DEALT WITH IN THE NOTE ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.
(F) PARAGRAPH 5(A) AND (B) AGREED.
(G) PARAGRAPH 5(C): OUR VIEW IS THAT THE OFFICIALS WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE LIST OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S NOMINEES BUT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE LIST. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE OPEN TO THE GEC TO ELECT ALL THE OFFICIAL NOMINEES OR NOT, AS THEY SAW FIT. WE CONSIDER THAT SUCH FREEDOM OF CHOICE IS ESSENTIAL IF THIS SYSTEM OF ELECTION IS TO BE CREDIBLE IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC.
(H) PARAGRAPH 5(D) AGREED.
(1) PARAGRAPH 5(E) : WE WOULD PREFER TO RETAIN THIS SENTENCE BUT SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING REDRAFT :
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THERE MIGHT ALSO BE CRITICISM THAT THE REGULAR PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS IN THE PROCESS OF ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION THAT THE LEGISLATURE SHALL BE CONSTITUTED BY ELECTIONS.''
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4.