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if it was true, as some maintain, that these reforms would not
in any event disturb the social, political, or commercial
equilibrium in Hong Kong, then why the urgency to effect changes before the blueprint for the longer-term future of the territory is agreed upon? If the reformers truly believed that the Basic Law will in any event provide for direct elections, then why the haste in forcing the pace now - - does this pressure not in itself imply a measure of doubt that the Basic Law could come up with a different solution, so that it is necessary to get a foot in the door? Or are our political activists afraid that
if they lose the momentum now, they will not be able to make a
pitch again in 1991 or 1992? Clearly their political credibility would then suffer but is this a good enough reason to accept solutions that are not in tune with the present realities governing the Hong Kong situation? Hong Kong will never be a
sovereign entity and any efforts to pretend otherwise will be doomed to failure. China will not tolerate any trappings of sovereignty to attach to Hong Kong's political structure, despite the "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" and the "high degree of autonomy" stated in the Joint Declaration, at least not until
China herself can decide that loyalties are fully secured.
Hong Kong therefore has to accept legal constraints on its scope for self-determination in a democratic fashion, including restrictions placed on the possible development of the legislature towards a future centre of political power. This fact will also have to be accepted by Westminster and the British public who reflexively still tend to treat Hong Kong's case in the mould of other colonies brought to independence; it is not necessary to enumerate in what respects the Hong Kong situation is different.
In introducing the Green Paper to this Council the Chief Secretary said that all options contained therein were genuine and that Government had no pre-conceived ideas as to the merits or
demerits of each. This may well be true but hides the fact
that the options themselves are limited because the Hong Kong Government has much less room to manoeuvre in 1987 than it had in 1984, when expectations of direct elections were first raised.
There is no mention as to where changes made in 1988 to the